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Civic engagement is vital for liberal democracy, the proper functioning of social, civic, and governmental 
institutions, and economic growth.  This report examines citizen participation in political and social civic 
life in California. We begin by comparing the state to the nation at large, and find that California lags the 
nation in most forms of civic engagement.  The data show that, on average, Whites were more engaged 
than Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians, and native citizens born in the US are more engaged than citizens 
born elsewhere and non-citizens.  To analyze whether these factors determine why civic engagement 
differs in California, we next employ a regression analysis.  The participation gaps between California 
and the rest of the nation (excluding New York and Texas) can be entirely explained by differences in 
demographics for four of the six measures of civic engagement.  For the other two, the differing 
demographic profile of California explains about a third to a half of the gaps.  We also find that ethnicity, 
race, and citizenship are generally the most important determinants and explain much of the California 
engagement gaps.  The fact that California has more Hispanics, Asians, naturalized citizens, and 
noncitizens than the rest of the US thus appears to go a long way toward explaining the lower civic 
engagement we observe in the state.  We conclude by comparing California to New York and Texas to 
ascertain if those states lag the rest of the nation for the same reasons as California.  Unsurprisingly, 
race, ethnicity, and citizenship also play large roles in explaining the participation gaps in New York and 
Texas.  However, some other factors have more impact in these other two states than in California 
(income and the low marital rate in New York, and education in Texas). 
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I. Introduction 
A. The Importance of Civic Engagement 
Alexis de Tocqueville keenly observed that a citizenry engaged in both political and civil associations is 
vital to liberal democracy.1  Without such, he warned, “civilisation itself would be endangered.”2  The 
assumption that a civically engaged citizenry results in a healthier republic underlies much current 
research in the area of civic engagement.  Involvement in civic affairs comprises more than just voting.  
Political civic engagement includes discussion of politics in the community and taking local political 
action, in addition to voting.  In addition, social civic engagement complements the political dimension 
with activities such as involvement in community groups and charitable volunteerism.  Meeting one 
another “face to face” increases connectivity and interpersonal trust which in turn encourages 
commitment to both the local community and to political interests at large (Putnam, 1995a).  One of 
civic engagement’s prominent proponents, Robert Putnam, argues that civic involvement creates 
communities and strengthens political interest.   Putnam refers to this type of engagement as “social 
capital” and argues that it can facilitate the proper functioning of social, civic, and governmental 
institutions3 or otherwise increase overall social welfare.4  Sociologists and economists alike have 
identified the important and beneficial roles that trust and social capital play in building strong public 
institutions (La Porta et al. 1997) and in stimulating overall economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; 
Easterly and Levine, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; Tabellini, 2010). 
B. Cause for Alarm in the Nation and California? 
Despite the importance of civic engagement, Putnam (1995a, 1995b, 2000) finds evidence of a decline in 
civic engagement in America. He expresses alarm that membership in fraternal organizations, parent-
teacher groups, and labor unions—all traditional forms of civic engagement—is declining.  Although 
some new environmental and other political associations have grown in membership, such non-
traditional “tertiary” or “mass-membership” organizations, where the members rarely meet one 
another, may not build community relationships.  Putnam (1995a) faults the decrease in connectivity on 
                                                          
*
 We thank Pete Peterson and Ashley Trim for helpful comments on this work.  
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 Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy In America (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing Inc., 2002), 473. 
2
 Tocqueville (2002), p.473.  
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 Fukuyama (2000, p.6) states that “[t]he economic function of social capital is to reduce the transaction costs 
associated with formal coordination mechanisms like contracts, hierarchies, and bureaucratic rules.” 
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 However, Fukuyama (2000, p.8) cautions that it is “… possible to have too much of a good thing. One person’s 
civic engagement is another’s rent-seeking….” Enthusiasm for civic engagement should perhaps be attenuated to 
the extent that social capital is employed merely to secure public resources for this or that interest group.   
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changing family structure, women entering the workforce, and increasingly isolating leisure activities 
such as television and other in-home entertainment.  In later work, Putnam (2007) argues that 
increasing diversity reduces trust, altruism, and cooperation in the community (at least in the short run), 
all of which are important for civic engagement. 
Most research affirms that civic engagement (at least as traditionally measured) has declined in recent 
decades (Galston and Levine, 1998; Levine and Lopez, 2002; Galston, 2004; Macedo, et al., 2005).5 
However, by some measures citizen participation has increased recently.  At the time of Putnam’s 
research (the 1980s and 1990s), voter eligible participation (VEP) rates were near 50 year lows and 
under 55% on average.6  According to the U.S. Elections Project, the most recent 2008 election saw 
national VEP rates climb to 62%.  The rates may indicate that civic participation is not in permanent 
decline in the US, and Putnam himself does not espouse a strict “declensionist” view.7 On the other 
hand, it may turn out that the 2008 election was only an exception to the downward trend.   
Researchers disagree on the implications of declining civic engagement for society.  Putnam (1995a, 
2000) focuses on the decline in membership in organizations like the PTA and Kiwanis as reducing the 
opportunity for individual trust-building interaction that can strengthen communitarian norms and 
increase social capital.  Skocpol and Fiorina (1995) and Skocpol (2003) argue that the changing structure 
of organizations, from member driven to top down and “oligarchic,” is problematic for participatory 
democracy.  Additionally, the new style of Washington-centered advocacy organizations may offer some 
level of important national civic participation; however, “too many valuable aspects of the old civic 
America are not being reproduced or invented in the new public world run by memberless 
organizations.”  (Skocpol, 1999, p. 499)  Other research argues for the primacy of associational 
institutions and the scope of membership over the level of individual member activity in the group 
(Wollebæk and Strømsnes, 2008; Alexander, et al., 2010).8  Counter to most research, Ladd (1999) and 
Zukin et al. (2006) optimistically suggests the decline in traditional organizational membership levels 
merely reflects a shift in the expression of civic engagement.  Ladd (1999) points to the increase of 
environmental advocacy groups and informal and formal local groups as evidence of vibrant, 
contemporary engagement.   However, Putnam (1995) views the style of the new advocacy 
organizations as lacking the power to build community interconnectivity.    
What about California?  Given the state’s role as a bellwether of social and political trends in the US, it is 
important to note that civic engagement is generally measured to be lower in California than elsewhere.  
California is a diverse state, and Putnam’s (2007) research demonstrates that many forms of social 
capital and civic engagement are negatively correlated with the ethnic diversity of a community.  
                                                          
5
 See Lin (2001) for a contrary view, based on the notion that social capital is moving to cyberspace and that 
Putnam (1995) was measuring the wrong outcomes. 
6
 See the U.S. Elections Project data at http://elections.gmu.edu/voter_turnout.htm.  
7
 “American history carefully examined is a story of ups and downs in civic engagement, not just downs….” 
(Putnam, 2000, p.25). 
8
 These authors argue that the main contribution of voluntary organizations to civic society is not the socialization 
of the groups’ members or the intensity of their participation, but rather the groups’ contributions to the 
“infrastructure of collective action,” which creates a pervasive sense of social capital in the community (Wollebæk 
and Strømsnes, 2008). 
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Putnam (2007) concludes from his own extensive empirical investigation of individuals’ attitudes and 
actions, as well as from a large body of previous literature, that immigration and multicultural diversity 
lead to social isolation, at least in the short run.  Therefore, the state’s large immigrant and non-white 
and Hispanic population may lead to less civic engagement than is found in more homogeneous states. 
One report found large gaps in political participation and volunteerism in the state across racial and 
ethnic groups and for immigrant status (Ramakrishnan and Baldassare, 2004).  The recent California 
Civic Health Index Report (NCOC et al., 2010) shows that civic engagement in California as a whole lags 
the national average in some measures of civic connectivity, such as discussing politics with family and 
friends.   
On the other hand, eligible Californians vote at about the same rate as elsewhere, and in some areas of 
civic engagement where the state has lagged in recent years, such as volunteering and working with 
neighbors, the gap is narrowing.  The Civic Health Index also compares California to New York and Texas, 
and generally concludes that Californians are more engaged than residents of those states.  However, 
the comparisons in the Civic Health Index may be misleading, for two reasons.  First, with about 12% of 
the nation’s population, California is large enough to significantly pull down the national civic 
engagement averages, attenuating the degree to which the state lags the nation in some measures.9  
Second, the comparison to New York and Texas reveals that these other large states also pull down the 
national average.   
These complications can be avoided by comparing California to the rest of the US excluding New York 
and Texas.  This comparison, which we pursue in this report, highlights that populous states in general - 
but California in particular - differ from smaller states when it comes to civic engagement. With this 
comparison group, we find larger gaps in civic participation between California and elsewhere than were 
found in the Civic Health Index.  In particular, California has statistically significant participation gaps in 
two of the three measures of political civic engagement we consider (political discussion and non-
electoral political action, but not voting) and three of the four measures of social civic engagement 
(group leadership, group participation and helping neighbors, but not dining with family).  Our research 
questions are then 1) why does California lag? and 2) does it lag for the same reasons as New York and 
Texas? 
C. The Determinants of Civic Engagement 
To begin to understand why civic engagement differs in California, a theoretical groundwork for 
analyzing voluntary participation in community affairs will be helpful.  The two main competing models 
of participation in a civic action (such as voting for example) are the rational actor model and the socio-
economic status (SES) model (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995).  In the rational actor model, 
pioneered by Downs (1957), the individual is assumed to behave as homo economicus and to compare 
the benefit with the cost of voting. The decisionmaker may consider both “hard” benefits (e.g., the 
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 A simple (hypothetical) numerical example illustrates the point.  If 25% of Californians vote and 75% of others in 
the US vote, then the national voting average will be about 69%.  The actual gap between California and the rest of 
the country, 50 percentage points, is 14% higher than the apparent gap of 44 percentage points calculated with 
reference to the national average (as in the methodology from the Civic Health Index). 
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probability that the individual’s vote affects the outcome of the election times the benefit following 
from the preferred outcome) and “soft” benefits (e.g., additional utility gained from fulfilling the 
responsibility of a citizen or of wearing an “I voted!” badge).  The cost of participation includes the 
opportunity cost of the individual’s time, the disutility of dealing with bureaucratic obstacles involved in 
participation, and the effort cost necessary to become familiar with the issues and to form opinions.10   
In contrast to the rational actor model, which is rooted in the well-developed theory of utility 
maximizing behavior from neoclassical microeconomics, what Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) term 
the SES model is really a collection of empirical predictions holding that people of higher socio-economic 
status will be more civically engaged.11  E.g., the SES model predicts that wealthier or more educated 
individuals will be more active in politics.12  The SES model is well verified in empirical literature such as 
Ramakrishnan and Baldassare (2004), who show that after race and ethnicity the three most important 
factors explaining civic engagement in California are education, home ownership, and income. 
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) also synthesize the rational actor and SES models with their civic 
voluntarism model (CVM).  The CVM postulates that individuals’ resources, psychological engagement 
with civic matters, and recruitment determine whether they participate in civic life.  That is, according to 
the CVM a person engages civically if he or she can do so, wants to do so, and is asked to participate.  
The most important resources Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) identify are free time, money, and 
civic skills, which include both organizational and communication skills.  The components of the CVM 
have obvious connections to the rational actor model.  The resources available to the individual affect 
both the benefits and costs of participation, as well as the constraints placed upon the individual’s 
choices. Furthermore, the degree of mental engagement with civic affairs affects the utility of pursuing 
political or electoral action.   
The CVM also explains the empirical regularities found with the SES model.  For example, Hispanics or 
other minorities may be less civically engaged because they lack the necessary time, money, and civic 
skills inculcated by education that are more readily available to whites.  Because these important 
resources are generally positively correlated with the schooling of the individual,13 education plays a 
central role in the CVM for explaining different levels of civic engagement among racial and other SES 
dimensions.  Education can have a strong effect on civic engagement because it reduces participation 
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 Cho (1999) highlights these latter two factors. 
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 Thus, the SES model hardly qualifies as a “model” to an economist or theoretical political scientist.   
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 See the many citations to studies in Milbrath and Goel (1977) confirming the SES model, which those authors 
summarize as, “No matter how class is measured, studies consistently show that higher class persons are more 
likely to participate in politics than lower class persons…” [p.92]. 
13
 The resource of time is a partial exception.  Those lacking a high school degree have the most free time, 
presumably due to unemployment, underemployment, and employing their labor inside the household, where 
schedules may be more flexible.  However, the differences in self-reported free time among those with a high 
school degree, some college, and a college degree are small (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995, p.292).  
Measuring the time resource with survey results on self-reported free time is likely to give a biased view of the 
relationship between time and participation, in any event.  Putnam (1995) notes that “[t]he available evidence 
strongly suggests that, in fact, long hours on the job are not associated with lessened involvement in civic life or 
reduced social trust.  Quite the reverse….”  Putnam quotes research showing that busier people both manage their 
time better and accomplish more with their available time than others (Robinson, 1990). 
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costs by improving “the cognitive skills that facilitate learning about politics” and lowers the cost of 
overcoming bureaucratic obstacles (Cho, 1999, p.1143).  
Other factors, such as trust, may influence an individual’s psychological engagement in politics and help 
explain why groups such as Asians and Hispanics tend to be less civically engaged.  Uslaner and Conley 
(2003) argue that ties within an ethnic community may prevent broader civic engagement.  The authors 
point out that perceived discrimination against an individual’s affiliated ethnic group may strengthen 
group identity but lead him or her away from participating in civic life outside the group, due to the 
destruction of generalized trust in outsiders.  The inclination of some cultures (Uslaner and Conley 
(2003) use the Chinese as an example) to focus inward toward the family also may create “particularized 
trust” within the group or a smaller social unit at the expense of generalized social trust.14  Anxiety over 
immigration status and a general sense of “social distance” from mainstream civic groups can also 
contribute to a lack of civic trust (Ramakrishnan and Viramontes, 2006).  Finally, Putnam (2007) finds 
that greater ethnic diversity in a community is associated with less trust toward those outside and inside 
an individual’s racial group. 
Immigration is another important factor that affects people’s psychological engagement in politics and 
helps explain differences in engagement among racial and ethnic groups.  Cho (1999) argues that 
foreign-born US residents often differ sharply from the native-born in their past political experiences.  
People born in the US are much more likely to be socialized from an early age to learn about and 
participate in voting and other democratic activities.  Immigrants, on the other hand, often come from 
countries with limited opportunity for citizen involvement and high levels of corruption in government, 
requiring many years of “political acculturation” or socialization in the US to build understanding, trust, 
and the desire to participate in civic life (Ong and Nakanishi, 2003).  This may explain in part why first-
generation immigrants in California volunteer less frequently than second- and later-generation 
immigrants (Ramakrishnan and Viramontes, 2006). 
A third factor influencing cognitive and physical engagement in civic life, and one that links the CVM 
directly to the rational agent model, is the perceived benefits of action. The rational agent model 
predicts that if the stakes for the individual are low because political action accomplishes little, the 
person is more likely to check out of the civic sphere. Griffin and Newman (2008, ch. 8) demonstrate 
empirically that an African American voter is no more likely to be a policy winner—defined as 
concordance between the desired and actual outcome—than a black nonvoter in the areas of defense 
and environmental spending, and only slightly more likely to be a winner regarding educational 
spending. Latino voters, on the other hand, are more likely to be winners than Latino nonvoters, and by 
about the same margin as for whites, but nevertheless Latino voters are still less likely to win than non-
Hispanic nonvoters.  Thus, for blacks and Hispanics, the rewards from voting appear to be small.   
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 Particularized and generalized trust are closely linked to the concepts of bonding (i.e., exclusive) and bridging 
(i.e., inclusive) capital, respectively (Gittel and Vidal, 1998; Putnam, 2000). 
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D. Our Approach and Findings 
Using data from the 2008 and 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS), our research looks at various 
measures of civic engagement, with an emphasis on California.   Consistent with the Civic Health Index 
report (NCOC et al., 2010), we look at measures for both political and social civic engagement and 
compare California with the nation excluding New York and Texas, with New York, and with Texas.  For 
political civic engagement we choose three measures:  whether the survey respondents discuss politics 
with family and friends, whether respondents are involved in one or more non-electoral political 
activities, and the 2008 voter turnout rates.   For social civic engagement, we look at four different 
measures:  group membership, group leadership, eating dinner with family, and helping a neighbor with 
a favor.   
In section II, we explore how civic engagement differs in California by looking at breakdowns of civic 
involvement among various subpopulations, including by race and citizenship status.  We find that while 
California indeed lags the nation in most forms of civic engagement, there appears to be no clear 
ordering of involvement among California, New York, and Texas.  Whites were more engaged than 
Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians.  Native citizens born in the US are more engaged than those born in 
Puerto Rico or other territories, naturalized citizens, and non-citizens. 
To analyze why civic engagement is different in California, we employ a regression analysis in section III.  
For each participation measure, we look at how race, citizenship status, income, education, and other 
demographic factors affect civic engagement in the nation and in California.  We find that the 
participation gaps between California and the rest of the nation (excluding New York and Texas) can be 
entirely explained (indeed, are over-explained) by differences in demographics for four of the six 
measures.  For the other two, the differing demographic profile of California explains about a third to a 
half of the gaps.  We also break apart the impact of individual factors, and find that ethnicity, race, and 
citizenship are generally the most important determinants and explain much of the California 
engagement gaps.  The importance of these factors persists despite controlling for SES indicators such as 
education and income, indicating that any formulation of the SES model of civic participation lacking 
racial and ethnic variables would be incomplete.  The fact that California has more Hispanics, Asians, 
naturalized citizens, and noncitizens than the rest of the US thus appears to go a long way toward 
explaining the lower civic engagement we observe in the state.  Our results are in line with much recent 
empirical work by economists, who analyze data from the US and abroad to find nearly universally that 
diversity in a community (heterogeneity) reduces civic engagement (see, e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 
2000).15  The results are also in accord with Putnam’s (2007) evidence that greater ethnic diversity leads 
to lack of trust in a community, social isolation, and less civic engagement. 
In section IV, we more directly compare California to New York and Texas to ascertain if those states lag 
the rest of the nation for the same reasons as California.  Unsurprisingly, race, ethnicity, and citizenship 
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 See Costa and Kahn (2003) for a review of more than a dozen recent articles in the economics literature studying 
the consequences of heterogeneity in the community for civic engagement.  See also the literature review by 
Anderson and Paskeviciute (2006), who state that “…there is mounting evidence that more homogenous 
communities have higher levels of social  interactions leading to a more highly developed civil society” (although 
their research leads to a more nuanced view). 
7 
 
also play large roles in explaining the participation gaps in New York and Texas.  However, some other 
factors have more impact in these other two states than in California.  In New York, income and the low 
marital rate are important.  The low level of educational attainment in Texas, by contrast, is a key driver 
of the gap in civic engagement in that state. 
In section V we draw some conclusions from our work and discuss the promise of the internet to provide 
social space for civic life. 
II. How Civic Engagement Differs in California 
In this section, we look at various measures of civic engagement in California taken from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS).  Most of the data we examine are from the Civic Engagement Supplement to 
the CPS, collected in November 2009.  We also look at electoral participation, using data from the Voting 
and Registration Supplement from November 2008.  The CPS samples have the advantages of a large 
sample size and careful weighting by the Census Bureau to allow state and nationally representative 
statistics to be computed.  All subpopulations are limited to individuals aged 18 and up.  Additional 
information regarding the survey data is in the appendix.  For each indicator of civic engagement, we 
compare California to the whole nation, to the rest of the US without New York and Texas, and to New 
York and Texas.  In the first subsection we consider political civic engagement along the dimensions of 
political discussion, non-electoral political activity, and voting behavior.  In the second subsection we 
turn to social civic engagement, and examine leadership and participation in groups, sharing family 
meals, and exchanging favors with neighbors.  For each measure, the averages are broken out by race 
and ethnicity, and also by citizenship.  These bivariate tabulations help identify which groups lag in civic 
engagement, and also serve to motivate the regression analysis in section III. 
For all the measures involving civic engagement outside the home, Whites were more engaged than 
Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians.  For the measure of engagement inside the household, eating dinner with 
family, Asians slightly outpace Whites.  For some variables, the differences among racial and ethnic 
groups are slight, but for others such as political discussion the gaps between Whites and others are 
large.  Regardless of the form of civic participation, native citizens born in the US are more engaged than 
those born in Puerto Rico or other territories, naturalized citizens, and non-citizens.  Native citizens born 
abroad of US parents are just as engaged as those born in the US for many measures, but lag in a few 
important activities such as voting and helping neighbors.   
Our findings are generally in accord with existing literature, and we have noted some of the similarities 
with results of previous studies below. 
A. Political Civic Engagement 
1. Discuss politics with others 
The first survey question regarding political civic engagement we consider asked, “How often were 
politics discussed when communicating with family and friends?” (during a typical month).  The results 
comparing the prevalence of political discussion among California, New York, Texas, and the entire US 
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are in Table 1 and Figure 1.  The table shows comparisons to the nation average and to the rest of the 
US without New York and Texas, while only the former is included in the figure.  In 2009, 27.4% of 
Californians discuss politics at least a few times per week or more, below the national average by 7.5 
percentage points.   A further 35.6% of Californians discuss politics at least once a month (but less than 
once per week), leaving 28.8% who do not talk about politics at all.  The fractions of New York and Texas 
residents who discuss politics weekly are just slightly below the national average at 33.4%.   
For the national averages differentiated by race, shown in  
 
Figure 2, Whites are most likely to discuss politics at all, followed by Blacks, Asians, and Hispanics.  
Almost two out of five Whites discuss politics weekly, compared to 29% of Blacks, 22% of Hispanics, and 
20% of Asian Americans.16 However, 39% of Asians report discussing politics at least once per month 
(but less than weekly), compared to only 32% of Hispanics.  Citizenship status also is associated with 
differences in the frequency of discussing politics (see Figure 3).   Those who are native citizens born 
abroad lead in discussing politics weekly, reporting 37.8%, followed closely by 37.2% for those who are 
native born in the US.17  Only 16.3% of those born in Puerto Rico discuss politics at least a few times per 
week.  Interestingly enough, naturalized citizens and non-citizens discuss politics at almost the same 
rate (23.3% and 22.7%, respectively).   
2. Non-electoral political activity 
We turn now to civic engagement in the form of non-electoral political activity.  The survey includes two 
measures of political involvement other than voting: whether, in the last year, the individual has “contacted or 
visited a public official—at any level of government—to express your opinion” and whether the respondent 
“bought or boycotted a certain product or service because of the social or political values of the company that 
provides it.”  If the respondent answered yes to either one of these, we deem him or her to have engaged in at 
least one non-electoral political activity for purposes of analysis. Results are in Table 2 and  
 
Figure 4.  California is 2.8 percentage points behind the national average of 17% in engaging in these 
political activities.  Contrast this finding with earlier data from 2002 indicating that Californians were just 
as likely as others in the US to write to elected officials (Ramakrishnan and Baldassare, 2004, p.12). New 
York and Texas reported slightly higher rates than California, with rates of political involvement at about 
16%.   
In the US, a race gap exists for non-electoral political activity (see Figure 5), as it also does for voting (as 
we show in the next subsection).  Whites lead with 21% saying they participate in one or more non-
electoral political activities.  In California, the figure is similar:  23.7% of Whites participate.  Blacks in 
California participate at a rate 8 percentage points higher than the national average of 9.6%, but still lag 
the participation rate of Whites. Only 6.4% of Hispanics and 5.75% of Asians in the US report non-
electoral political involvement.  Ramakrishnan and Baldassare (2004, p.48) also found that Blacks in 
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 While “native born in the US” appears to be redundant, the survey distinguishes between that category and 
“native, born in Puerto Rico” and “native, born abroad of American parents”. 
9 
 
California had much less citizen contact with elected officials than Whites, and that Latinos and Asian 
Americans are underrepresented in most types of political activities.  Our findings are also in accord with 
those of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, p.233), who found for the US in general the same ordering 
of rates of contacting public officials among Whites, Blacks, and Latinos that we do. 
Similar to the results for political discussion, citizenship affects the propensity to engage in political 
activities.  US citizens by birth, born in the US or abroad, lead in non-electoral political activity, at rates 
of about one in five (see Figure 6).  Those born in US territories, naturalized citizens, and noncitizens 
have far lower rates of political involvement. 
3. Voter turnout 
To measure electoral political activity, we consider whether the individual claimed to have voted in the 
2008 presidential election.18  See Table 3 and Figure 7.  California, with a rate of 63.4% that is similar to 
the national average of 63.6% for voting age citizens, had a greater voter turnout than New York and 
Texas.  That Californians voted at nearly the same rate as the rest of the US stands in contrast with 
findings from the earlier 2000’s.  Voting in California lagged the nation for the first time in decades in 
2002 (Ramakrishnan and Baldassare, 2004), and continued to lag in the 2004 general election 
(McDonald, 2008). Of the three states, Texas had the lowest voter turnout in 2008 at 56.1%.  Overall, in 
2008, Californians were relatively civically engaged as voters.  However, the analysis in the next section 
shows that if New York and Texas are removed from the national average, then California continues to 
lag in its voting rate by a few percentage points.  We will explore this in section III.C.3. 
The breakdown of the voting turnout by race and ethnicity is in Figure 8. As with the other measures, 
Whites are the most involved voters (66.1% voted across the US), although Blacks do not lag by much 
(64.7%).  It is well known that the Black turnout was especially high in the 2008 Presidential election, 
with an African American on the ballot for the first time in US history.  Historically, Black voting rates 
lagged those of Whites (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Verba, Schlozman, Brady, 1995).  Hispanics and Asians 
were much less likely to vote (50% and 48%, respectively), as has been found elsewhere in the literature 
(Ong and Nakanishi, 2003; Ramakrishnan and Baldassare, 2004).  Citizens born in the US voted at a 
higher rate (65%) than those born abroad or naturalized (54%) or born in a US territory (48%) (see Figure 
9).  All of these results are in line with the voluminous literature on voting behavior and its relationship 
to sociodemographic factors.19 
B. Social Civic Engagement 
1. Group leadership 
The first measure of social civic engagement we examine is participation in civic groups.  The survey asks 
if the individual had been an officer or served on a committee of any group or organization in the past 
year.  The results are in Table 4 and Figure 10. The US average for this measure of civic leadership is 
                                                          
18
 Refer to footnote 32 for discussion on treatment of NA, refusals, and answers of “don’t know” for the voting 
question. 
19
  The papers collected in Niemi and Weisberg (2001, 2010), particularly those in Part III of each volume, provide a 
good introduction to the literature on the determinants of the propensity to vote. 
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9.7%.  Texas is close behind at 9.6%.  California is slightly less at 7.5% but higher than New York at 5.8%.  
In 2009, more Whites engaged in group leadership than others, with a national average of 12.0% (see 
Figure 11).  Hispanics have the lowest measure at 3.1%.  The low leadership rate for Hispanics is in 
accord some other findings indicating that Latinos participate in groups less in general (Ramakrishnan 
and Viramontes, 2006), but in contrast to the specific finding of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) that 
Hispanics are the most likely group to serve on a local governmental board such as a school or zoning 
board. The US average for group leadership is led by native citizens who were born abroad, who 
reported 11.9% (see Figure 12).  Those who are native citizens born in Puerto Rico report the lowest 
level of leadership at 1.9%.   
2. Group participation  
While groups need leadership for effective civic engagement, they also need actively involved members.  
We turn now to civic engagement in the form of participation in various types of civic groups. The 
groups specifically mentioned in the survey were school groups, neighborhood or community 
associations (such as PTA or neighborhood watch groups), service or civic organizations (such as 
American Legion or Lions Club), sports or recreational clubs, and religious institutions (such as churches, 
synagogue, and mosques).  For the latter category, participation had to be beyond normal attendance at 
religious services.  Respondents indicated whether they had participated in any of these organizations in 
the past year.  Respondents could also report participation in groups not listed, and these also are 
included in our statistics. 
The results for group membership20 are in Table 5 and Figure 13.  In 2009, California and Texas had the 
same level of participation with 33% stating membership in any type of group.  California is only 1.5 
percentage points below the national average in this category.  However, the nature of participation in 
California differs from that of the US at large.  When we examine participation in individual types of 
groups, Californians are much less likely to participate in religious groups (14.7% vs. 19.8% for the whole 
US) and service and civic associations (6.0% vs. 8.0% for the US).  The participation rates in California for 
the other types of groups are about the same as elsewhere. 
We see racial differences in group participation, consistent with previous studies (Ramakrishnan and 
Viramontes, 2006).
21
  Leading all racial groups, 39% of Whites nationally engage in at least one social 
organization (see  
 
Figure 14).  At 21%, Hispanics report the least amount of group participation in the US.  Blacks and 
Asians fall in the middle ground with 33% and 29% participation rates, respectively.  For citizenship 
status (see Figure 15), the same two categories as usual, native residents born in the US or abroad, 
report the highest group membership (both with 37%).  Noncitizens and those born in a US territory 
such as Puerto Rico have the lowest group participation rates. 
                                                          
20
 We use the terms “participation” and “membership” as synonyms here. 
21
 Ramakrishnan and Viramontes (2006) found that Latinos and first generation immigrant Asians lag the average 
group participation rate in the US and California.  They also found that Blacks lag the average participation rate in 
the nation, but not within California. 
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3. Dining with family 
Social civic engagement often begins with the smallest social unit, the family.  The survey contains a measure of 
engagement in the family:  dining together.  The survey asks “how often did you eat dinner with any of the other 
members of your household?”  Both California and Texas lag only a small bit (1.2 percentage points) below the 
national average of eating dinner with the family at least once a week of 87.9% (see Table 6 and  
 
Figure 16).  New York is slightly above the national average.  Unlike the other sorts of engagement we 
consider, in this category Asian Americans participate more than others (see Figure 17).  Over 91% of 
Asians eat dinner with family at least a few times per week, compared to Whites at 89%.  Blacks and 
Hispanics have lower prevalence of sharing weekly family meals, with rates of around 83%. Other 
research indicates that these patterns may be set from early age, since African Americans and Hispanic 
young children are far more likely to never eat lunch or dinner with their family (Flores, Tomany-
Korman, and Olson, 2005). The US average for native citizens born in the US who eat dinner weekly is 
88.08%.  Regarding the breakdown by citizenship status (see Figure 18), all categories have fairly similar 
participation rates.   
4. Helping neighbors   
Some authors contend that reciprocal altruism is a vital part of civic engagement.  Florini (2003, p.47) 
states that reciprocal altruism is the basis of social trust, in that reciprocity norms are a critical part of 
social capital and alleviate free riding behavior in society.  The survey asks a question regarding 
reciprocal behavior:  “how often did you and your neighbors do favors for each other?” where helping a 
neighbor is defined as “watching each other’s children, helping with shopping, house sitting, lending 
garden or house tools, and other small acts of kindness.”  The results are in Table 7 and Figure 19. 
All three large states fell below the national average of 15.4% for helping a neighbor on a weekly basis.   
However, many more help their neighbor at least once per month or more.  Only 13% of Californians help their 
neighbors at least weekly; however, 42.1% of Californians help their neighbors at least monthly, which is above 
the national average of 40.8%.   
 
Figure 20 shows that nationally, Whites and Asians help their neighbors the most on a monthly basis 
(44.64% and 35.26%, respectively).  Native citizens, born in the US, lead with 16.7% among citizenship 
categories in helping a neighbor a few times per week and 42.11% helping once per month or more (see 
Figure 21).   
III. Why Civic Engagement Differs in California 
The results in the previous section show that, generally speaking, that non-Whites, Hispanics, 
noncitizens, and citizens not born in the US do not participate as much in civic life as Whites and native 
citizens born in the country.  Since California’s share of these less-engaged groups is disproportionate to 
that of the rest of the US, at least part of the civic participation gaps may be explained by these 
demographic factors. Before drawing any conclusions, however, the analysis must be extended in 
several regards. Other demographic factors besides race and citizenship are correlated with civic 
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engagement.  Ignoring them would give an incomplete picture of participation in civic life in California.  
In order to understand which factors are actually driving civic engagement, a multiple regression 
framework is necessary to examine each demographic variable holding other things equal.  Also, we do 
not want to assume that the engagement patterns are the same in California as elsewhere.  This 
requires an analytic framework that allows the propensity of African Americans to vote (for example) to 
be different in California from elsewhere. 
In this section, we take a closer look at the gaps in the various measures of civic engagement between 
California and the rest of the nation.  The reference group in the discussion below is the entire US except 
for California, New York, and Texas, which we call US-3 (i.e., the US minus the three most populous 
states).  The aim of the analysis here is to break down each gap by contributing economic and 
demographic factors, to understand why California lags.  We first discuss the regression methodology 
we use for the decompositions of the gaps.  In part B, we present how the demographics in California 
differ from those elsewhere.  In part C and D, we apply the results of the first two parts to comprehend 
the driving forces behind the gaps in civic engagement in California. 
A. Methodology 
For each measure of civic engagement considered, we begin by recalculating the fraction of the 
subpopulations of California and US-3 that participate in the particular form of civic involvement.  Unlike 
in the previous section, here survey responses coded as N/A, “refused,” and “don’t know” are dropped 
from the sample, so that only respondents who gave definite answers are included in the engagement 
rates estimated.22 The difference between the means for the two groups is the engagement gap in 
California (where a positive figure for a gap means that the civic engagement rate is lower in California 
than in US-3). We then split the engagement gap between California and US-3 into two components:  
the part explained by differences in demographics and the unexplained residual.  Each component, in 
turn, is decomposed into the underlying contributions from each demographic variable.  For example, 
we show below that 3.4 percentage points of the nine point gap between California and US-3 in 
discussing politics is explained by there being more Hispanics, Asians, and non-citizens in California, all 
of whom are less likely to discuss politics.  The rest of the gap not explained by differences in 
demographics, the “unexplained” portion, arises because (for example) Hispanics living in California may 
have a different propensity to discuss politics than Hispanics do elsewhere.    Finally, even after 
controlling for all differences in the demographic composition of the state and the propensities of 
various demographic groups to discuss politics, the attitudes held by California residents of any 
demographic type toward discussing politics may be fundamentally different than those held by 
residents elsewhere, and this contributes further to the unexplained portion of the gap. 
More formally, the technique we use to break down the gaps is called the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition.23  Let  ̅ 
 
 be the average of the jth demographic variable for the gth group.  For 
illustration, consider the two groups g = CA for California and g = US-3 for the US excluding the three 
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 The one exception is for the voting variable; see footnote 32. 
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largest states.  Let   
 
 be the estimate of the regression coefficient for the jth demographic variable in a 
multiple linear regression of civic engagement variable Yg on the K demographic variables and a 
constant,24 using data only from group g.  Then the gap in mean outcomes between the groups, 
   ̅      ̅  , can be decomposed into explained and unexplained components.  The first part of 
the gap, denoted Q for the quantity effect, is  
   ∑   
    ( ̅ 
      ̅ 
  )      (1) 
which is the portion explained by differences in the averages of the demographic variables.25  The 
quantity effect computes how outcome Y is expected to differ between groups if each individual had the 
group’s average characteristics and the demographics were related to Y as they are in the reference 
group (US-3).  Each term in the sum isolates a particular variable’s contribution to the quantity effect Q.  
For example, if Y is a voting variable and the first X is a Hispanic indicator variable, then the first term in 
(1) shows how much of the gap between California and the rest of the nation is due to differing 
proportions of Hispanics in the two subpopulations, holding other demographic characteristics equal, 
and assuming Hispanics everywhere had the same propensity to vote that they do in US-3. 
The remainder of the gap, denoted U for “unexplained,” stems from differences in the coefficients:    
   ∑  ̅ 
  (  
       
  )      (2) 
The unexplained part of the gap is due to differences in the regression coefficients between groups. In 
the expression, the differences in how the demographics relate to the outcome (as reflected by the 
regression coefficients) are weighted by the demographic variables held fixed at their California average 
levels.  Again, each term in the sum is the contribution of a single variable to U.  Continuing with the 
example above, the term for j = 1 in (2) shows how much of the gap between California and the rest of 
the nation is due to Hispanics having a different propensity to vote in California than elsewhere.  The 
term for j = 0 in U is the difference in the estimated intercepts from the regressions, and is the residual 
unexplained part of the gap after accounting for all differences in group average demographics and 
regression coefficients. This third type of impact is sometimes called the pure “group membership” 
effect.  Together, Q and U exactly match the total size of the gap, so that       .  Further details 
related to the decompositions are in the appendix. 
B. The Demographic Difference in California 
To understand the decompositions of the gap for a particular measure of civic engagement, we must 
first look at how the demographics differ between California and the rest of the nation, and second at 
how demographics relate to civic engagement.  While the latter task involves looking at regressions of 
the particular measure of civic engagement on demographic variables, the former can be examined here 
before delving into specific types of civic engagement.  Table 8 contains the comparison along each 
measured demographic dimension of California to US-3, using the data for 2009 used in all regressions 
                                                          
24
 The constant is X0 = 1. 
25
 Since all statistics and regressions are computed using survey weights, the averages are to be understood as 
weighted averages that estimate the mean values in the subpopulation. 
14 
 
except for the voting sample.26  The demographic profiles for New York and Texas are also included in 
the table for later reference. 
1. Demographic profile in 2009  
Comparing California (in column one of Table 8) to US-3 (in the last column), we see that Hispanics in 
California compose a much higher fraction of the total population.  There are distinct racial differences 
as well.  California has a lower proportion of Whites and relatively fewer Blacks (all comparisons in this 
section should be understood as made to US-3).  Asians make up more of the population of California. 
Regarding citizenship, California has fewer native citizens born in the US, more naturalized citizens, and 
more non-citizens than elsewhere.   
Education is a mixed picture in California.  Fewer California residents have a high school degree.  
However, the proportion who attain education above a high school degree is about equal to the rest of 
the state, although fewer individuals hold advanced degrees.  California is also wealthier and more of its 
residents live in metropolitan areas. The state’s residents tend to be younger. California has slightly 
more men, and marital rates are lower in the state. 
2. Demographic profile in 2008 
For the voting sample, survey data are from 2008.  The subpopulation for the voting sample is further 
restricted to eligible voters.  Due to the different subpopulation, demographic change, and sampling 
variation, the estimated demographic profiles of California and elsewhere are different in 2008 than 
they are in the following year.  Table 9 shows the profiles for 2008, and here we comment briefly on 
differences between the years’ samples in how California compares to the rest of the US. 
The largest difference between Table 8 and Table 9 for California is that in the eligible-to-vote 
subpopulation the state does not have more people lacking a high school degree than elsewhere.  
California appears more educated across the distribution, with a greater fraction of its residents holding 
college degrees of each type than in US-3.  There are other differences compared to the 2009 sample, 
but none greatly affect the comparison of California to US-3.27 
C. Political Civic Engagement 
In this section, California’s gaps in the political measures of civic engagement—political discussion, non-
electoral political activity, and voting—are dissected.  The subsequent section discusses the 
decompositions of the gaps in social civic engagement.  
                                                          
26
 Survey weights are used to estimate the subpopulation averages in the table. Nevertheless, the estimates may 
not match better estimates of state or national demographics from other sources designed for that purpose.  The 
purpose of the table is not to provide the best estimate the demographic profile of California or the other areas, 
but to show the values of  ̅ 
   and  ̅ 
     used in application of equation (1) below. 
27
 For example, in the 2008 vote-eligible subpopulation, 78% of California residents are estimated to be native 
citizens born in the US, whereas in the 2009 subpopulation excluding non-citizens, only 62% are in that category.  
However, in both cases the comparison to the rest of the US shows that California has a far lower share of people 
in that category.  
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1. Political discussion 
We first examine civic engagement through discussing politics with others.  The binary variable Discuss 
Politics takes value 1 if the individual typically discussed politics once a month or more when 
communicating with family and friends.28  Discuss Politics equals zero otherwise. There is a gap of nine 
percentage points between California and elsewhere in discussing politics with others.  We begin by 
looking at the regression of the political discussion variable on demographic explanatory variables for 
the reference group US-3. The coefficients from the regression, shown in Table 10, are the   
     
parameters in equation (1).29  Column one of Table 10, for the dependent variable Discuss Politics, 
shows that Hispanics, Blacks, and Asians are less likely to discuss politics than are Whites (the excluded 
categorical variable in the regression).30  Native citizens born abroad are more likely to discuss politics, 
while foreign-born naturalized citizens show the opposite tendency.  The propensity to discuss politics 
rises with the level of education and income, although the latter is significant only for the highest 
income category.  Other research also finds that wealthier and more educated individuals are more 
likely to pay attention to politics, to hold political knowledge, and to engage in its discussion (Eveland et 
al., 2005).  Living in a metropolitan area is associated with more discussion of politics, as is being female 
or married.  Gender differences in political knowledge and discussion are widely reported and explored 
in the literature (e.g., Dow, 2009). The likelihood that the individual discusses politics is greatest for the 
56 to 65 age group.  Much previous work examining data from the US and California confirms that the 
younger the individual (except perhaps for the eldest Americans), the lower the level of political 
participation of various forms (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; 
Ramakrishnan and Baldassare, 2004). 
With an understanding of the demographic differences in California and the reference regression 
results, we can now unpack the determinants of the gap in political discussion between the state and 
the rest of the nation.  Results from the decomposition of the gap are presented in Table 11.  The table 
shows a summary of results, whereas the complete estimation results for the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition can be found in Table 20 in the Appendix.  
The results in Table 11 show that differences in demographics account for 37.3%, or 3.4 points, of the 9 
percentage point gap.  The single largest contributor to the explained gap, making up slightly over half of 
Q, is the difference in the racial composition of the state.  The greatest impact regarding race comes 
from the fact that California has many more Asians, who are less likely to engage in political discussions 
than any other racial group.  The second largest factor is ethnicity.  The greater proportion of Hispanics, 
who are less likely to discuss politics than non-Hispanics, accounts for 39.4% of the explainable gap.  
Differences in the citizenship profile explain about one-fifth of Q.  Despite a minor amount of offsetting 
                                                          
28
 For this and all other civic engagement variables except for Voted, survey responses coded as N/A, “refused,” 
and “don’t know” are dropped from the estimation sample in this section to keep the dependent variable binary. 
29
 The regressions are linear probability models, and so the magnitude of the coefficients are readily interpretable.  
For example, the coefficient of -0.048 for Hispanics in the first column of Table 10 implies that Hispanics are 4.8 
percentage points less likely to discuss politics than non-Hispanics, other things (including race and citizenship) 
equal.  It is worth noting that the R
2
 of this and the following regressions are relatively low, ranging from 0.05 to 
0.15. 
30
 We only discuss coefficients that are statistically significant. 
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by having more native citizens who were born abroad (who are more likely to discuss politics), the 
greater proportion of non-citizens implies that there will be less political discussion in California.  
Education is the only other factor that adds significantly to the gap, although it contributes much less 
than the ethnicity, race, and citizenship factors.  The facts that California has more residents without a 
high school degree and fewer with an advanced university degree both widen the gap in political 
discussion.  The educational attainment variables altogether account for 9.2% of the explained gap. The 
impacts of age, gender, and marital status are small and statistically insignificant. 
Ethnicity, race, citizenship status, and education together thus account for more than the entire 
explained gap—122% of it, to be exact.  What does this mean, since the contributions of all categories of 
demographic variables must sum to 100%?  The answer lies in the fact that two other factors, income 
and metropolitan location, contribute negatively to Q.  California is relatively wealthier and more urban 
than elsewhere, and since both of these increase the propensity to discuss politics, they make up 
about -29% of Q.  This implies that without the mitigating effect of income and urban location, the gap 
would be even higher (Q would be 29% higher, for a total gap Δ of 10.0 percentage points, in fact).  The 
same logic applies to any negative percentages encountered below: such demographic factors by 
themselves would cause California to have more civic engagement than elsewhere.  Thus, to summarize 
the discussion, while the greater wealth and population density of California stimulate political 
discussion in the state, the negative impacts of having more Hispanics, Asians, non-citizens, and high-
school dropouts and fewer holders of advanced degrees predominate in the final analysis.  The 
differences in demographics, altogether, compose 37.3% of the total gap. 
The remainder of the gap, U, warrants less discussion because the statistical significance of the 
estimates of its components are mostly insignificant.  Table 20 shows that the largest factors in the 
unexplained portion of the political discussion gap are metropolitan location and citizenship.  Residents 
in metropolitan locations are less likely to discuss politics than are similar residents elsewhere in the US, 
which contributes toward the lower level of political discussion in California.  As an offsetting factor, 
however, native citizens born in the US are more likely to discuss politics in California than elsewhere. 
2. Non-electoral political activity 
The binary variable Political Acts takes value 1 if, in the past year, the individual contacted or visited a 
public official or participated in a boycott motivated by the social or political values of the targeted 
company.  Political Acts takes value zero if neither action was performed in the past year. There is a gap 
of 3.6 percentage points between California and elsewhere in such non-electoral political acts.  As in the 
previous section, we begin by looking at the regression of the binary variable Political Acts on 
demographic explanatory variables for the reference group (see column two of Table 10).  Hispanics, 
Blacks, and Asians are less likely to engage in political acts than are Whites.  Ramakrishnan and 
Baldassare (2004) also found in their study of California residents that controlling for demographics does 
not eliminate racial disparities in most types of political activity.  Multiracial residents are more likely to 
contact politicians or boycott products.  Native citizens born in Puerto Rico or other territories, foreign-
born naturalized citizens, and non-citizens are less likely than native citizens born in the US to perform 
political acts.  The propensity toward political action generally rises with the level of education, income, 
and age, although for the latter activity tails off for those above 75 years old.  These relationships 
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between political activity and education, income, and age have also been found for the US (Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady, 1995) and California residents in earlier data (Ramakrishnan and Baldassare, 
2004, pp.34,37) as well as for 2008 (PPIC, 2008). Women are slightly less likely to engage in non-
electoral political action.  Metro areas are associated with less political activity, but insignificantly so, 
despite the findings of other research that the weaker social relations and greater “psychological 
disengagement” of residents of larger cities results in them being much less likely to contact officials 
(Oliver, 2000). 
Summary results for the determinants of the gap in non-electoral political action between California and 
the reference group are presented in Table 12.  As before, the complete estimation results can be found 
in Table 20.  Table 12 shows that differences in demographics account for 123% of the 3.6 percentage 
point gap, implying that demographics alone would cause the gap to be even larger than it is.  As for 
political discussion, the three largest contributors to the explained gap in Political Acts are the three 
closely related elements of ethnicity, race, and citizenship.  These three factors account for almost nine-
tenths of the explained gap.  Differences in the citizenship profile (mostly the lower proportion of native 
citizens born in the US) alone explain half of Q.  Race and ethnicity differences each contribute about 
one-fifth of the explained gap.  As before, the greatest impacts from these variables come from the 
greater number of Asians and Hispanics.  Education is the fourth factor that adds significantly to the gap, 
although as before its impact is much smaller than that of citizenship, ethnicity, and race.  Again, the 
twin facts that California has more residents lacking a high school degree and fewer with an advanced 
university degree both widen the gap in Political Acts.  None of the impacts of the other demographic 
variables are significant at the 5% level. 
The other component of the total gap, U, acts to decrease the size of Δ.  Almost all of the individual 
components of U are insignificant at the 5% level.  The lone exception is for those lacking a high school 
degree, who are more politically engaged in California than elsewhere, which acts to decrease the size 
of the gap in Political Acts.  
3. Voting  
California’s voting rate is close to that elsewhere.  The voting rate of 63.3% in the state, compared to the 
rate of 64.8% for US-3, yields a gap of only 1.4 percentage points.31  The gap is not significant at the 5% 
level.  The binary variable Voted takes value 1 if the individual voted in the November 2008 elections, 
and zero if not.32  The regression of Voted for the reference group is reported in column three of Table 
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 The figures do not add up because of rounding. 
32
 Unlike for the other civic engagement variables considered in this section, survey responses of N/A, “refused”, 
and “don’t know” are treated as “did not vote.”  We thus adopt the convention from past census reports, and 
others in the literature, although we do not agree with it.  Treating someone who refused to answer an entire 
survey on multiple subjects (and so appears in the data as N/A for the voting question) as a non-voter is arbitrary, 
and can only artificially depress the voting rate calculated from the data.  We suspect previous reports follow this 
convention because without it, the implied voting rates are embarrassingly—and clearly erroneously—large.  For 
example, if we treat responses of N/A, “refused”, and “don’t know” as missing data (consistent with our treatment 
of the other civic engagement variables), then the estimated national voting rate is 73.8% for 2008.  This estimate 
is greater (to an unbelievable extent) than estimates based on actual numbers of ballots cast, which are around 
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10.  Hispanics, Native Americans, and especially Asians are less likely to vote than are Whites, while 
Blacks were nearly ten percentage points more likely to vote than Whites (other things equal).  A lower 
raw voting rate for African Americans than Whites, but the opposite comparison after controlling for 
socioeconomic status, is commonly found in the literature (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990).  Native citizens 
born in US territories and naturalized citizens are both far less likely to vote than citizens born in the US.  
The inclination to vote increases monotonically with educational attainment, income, and age (except 
for the eldest).  These inclinations have also been found to hold for California eligible voters in particular 
in past (Ramakrishnan and Baldassare, 2004, pp.34,37) and concurrent (PPIC, 2008) years. Other 
research indicates that the apparent effect of education on the propensity to vote from the regression is 
causal, and not merely driven by unobserved factors correlated with education and voting (Milligan, 
Moretti, and Oreopoulos, 2004).  The parabolic shape of the life cycle pattern of voter turnout is also 
well established in the literature (Verba and Nie, 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980).33  Women are 
four percentage points more likely to vote than men, and married individuals are 7.4 percentage points 
more likely to vote than their unmarried counterparts.   
The determinants of the small gap in voting rates between California and US-3 are shown in Table 13 
(more extensive results are in Table 20).  Table 13 shows that differences in demographics account for 
110% of the 1.4 percentage point gap.  Although the gap itself is not statistically significant, some 
regressors do contribute significantly toward the gap.  The determinants of the gap are somewhat 
different than for the other political civic engagement variables examined above.  The largest 
contributor to the voting gap is the set of racial indicators, which alone would lead to a 2.1 percentage 
point gap.  Examination of the detailed decomposition of Q in Table 20 reveals that the higher Asian and 
smaller Black population in California drives the result.  The next greatest impact on the explained gap 
comes from the educational variables.  California’s higher educational profile of its voting-eligible 
population (recall the discussion in section B.2 above) favors higher voting rates, and the total impact of 
educational demographics is to reduce the explained gap by 1.6 percentage points.  Differences in the 
citizenship profile explain nearly four-fifths of Q, and the greater proportion is Hispanics in the state 
explains a further one-third.  The lesser impact of Hispanics toward explaining the voting gap, compared 
to the other measures of political civic engagement, is due in part to the fact that almost 40% of 
Hispanics of voting age in California are ineligible to vote because they report that they are not citizens.  
The relatively greater income in California acts to reduce the size of the gap, and the greater fraction of 
unmarried residents in a minor positive contributor to the voting gap.   
Since the unexplained component accounts for only -9.8 percent of the total gap, we do not focus on its 
determinants, except to note that the one with the greatest impact is from naturalized citizens, who are 
more likely to vote in California than elsewhere.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
62% (McDonald, 2010), which indicates that the CPS data suffer from severe over-reporting bias (Bernstein et al., 
2001). 
33
 Low voting rates among the young may be due to residential and occupational mobility, while the declining rates 
among the elderly are likely due to fatigue and constraints on physical mobility (Cho, 1999). 
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D. Social Civic Engagement 
We now look at California’s gaps in the social dimension of civic engagement.  The variables considered 
here are leadership of and participation in groups and helping neighbors with reciprocal favors. 
1. Group leadership 
The binary variable Group Leadership takes value 1 if the individual had been an officer or served on a 
committee of any group or organization in the past year.  Group Leadership equals zero otherwise. 
There is a gap of three percentage points between California and elsewhere in reported group 
leadership.  The regression of Group Leadership on the demographic explanatory variables using data 
from the reference group is reported in column one of Table 14.  The estimated regression coefficients 
show that Asians are less likely to serve as group officers or committee members than are Whites.  In 
contrast to the political measures of engagement, Hispanics are not significantly less likely to take on 
leadership roles than are non-Hispanic.  Foreign-born naturalized citizens, men, and unmarried residents 
are less likely to take leadership positions in groups.  Those living in metropolitan areas are 3.2 
percentage points less likely to lead groups, after controlling for other factors, which echoes findings in 
the literature (Oliver, 2000).34 The propensity toward group leadership generally rises with the level of 
education and age (again excepting the oldest age group).  Group leaders have disproportionally higher 
income, other things equal, although the coefficient is significant only for the highest income group.   
Table 15 contains the summary of the decomposition of the gap in group leadership for California.  The 
full Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is in Table 21 for reference.  The results in Table 15 show that 
differences in demographics account for a bit more than the entire total gap.  Citizenship and race are 
the two largest contributors to the explained gap, together accounting for more than half of Q.  The 
lower proportion of native citizens and the higher proportion of naturalized citizens cause most of the 
impact from the citizenship variables.  The greatest impact regarding race, as commonly found for the 
political civic engagement variables examined above, comes from the Asian group, who are less likely to 
serve as officers or on committees than any other racial group.  Ethnicity contributes no significant 
amount to the gap, which contrasts starkly with the importance of Hispanics in explaining the gaps in 
the political civic engagement measures. The next largest contribution to the gap is from metropolitan 
residence.  The relatively urban nature of the state accounts for almost one-fifth of Q.  The income and 
age profiles largely offset each other, with the higher income in California offsetting the younger age 
profile.  The greater fraction of residents in the lowest educational category also contributes a small 
amount toward the explained gap. 
As with the voting variable, since the unexplained component accounts for such a small part of the total 
gap (-8.6 percent), its determinants are less interesting.  The factor with the greatest significant impact 
is native Citizens born in the US, who in California are more likely to lead groups than elsewhere.   
2. Group participation 
The binary variable Group Participation takes value 1 if, in the past year, the individual participated in 
any of the various sorts of organizations described in section II.B.2.  If no participation in any sort of civic 
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 Oliver (2000) finds that residents of large cities are less likely than other to serve on a community board. 
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or community group, including unlisted types of groups volunteered by the respondent, Group 
Participation is equal to zero for the individual. 
There is a gap of 3.3 percentage points between California and US-3 in group participation.  To begin to 
look at the decomposition of the gap, we first discuss the regression results for Group Participation for 
the reference group (see column two of Table 14).  The results are qualitatively similar to the regression 
for Group Leadership, with one exception.  While Blacks are neither more nor less likely to take 
leadership roles in civic groups than Whites, they are almost four percentage points more likely to 
participate in groups as Whites (mainly religious groups and school or community organizations).  After 
controlling for the other demographics, women have a greater propensity for participation than men, an 
interesting result standing in contrast to earlier literature finding that women have fewer group 
memberships on average than men, before and sometimes even after controlling for other individual 
characteristics (e.g., Curtis, Baer, and Grabb, 2001; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001; Lam, 2006).  
Summary results for the determinants of the gap in group participation between California and the 
reference group are presented in Table 16.  As before, the complete estimation results can be found in 
Table 21.  Table 16 shows that differences in demographics account for 139% of the 3.3 percentage 
point gap, implying that demographics alone would cause the gap to be 4.6 percentage points.  As with 
group leadership, the largest contributor to the explained gap in Group Participation is citizenship, which 
accounts for over a third of Q.  The impact of race on the explained gap is about the same size as for 
group leadership, 21 percent of the whole, but it is statistically significant only at the 10% level.  The 
Hispanic impact is estimated to be larger than that for race, but is also significant only at the 10% level.  
Differences in the profiles of educational attainment and income offset each other, as for group 
leadership.  None of the impacts of the other demographic variables are significant at the 5% level. 
The other component of the total gap, U, acts to decrease the size of Δ by 38 percentage points.  One of 
the two factors with the greatest impacts is native Citizens born in the US, who in California are more 
likely to participate in groups than elsewhere. This result matches the similar finding for group 
leadership.  The other important factor in U, and the largest in magnitude, is residing in a metropolitan 
area.  Such residents are much less likely to participate in groups in California than elsewhere.  
3. Helping neighbors 
Californians are much less likely (by 9.4 percentage points) to report helping neighbors than are 
residents elsewhere.  The binary variable Help Neighbor takes value 1 if the individual reported that 
favors were exchanged with neighbors at least once a month on average during the past year.  The 
regression of Help Neighbor for the reference group is reported in column three of Table 14.  Hispanics, 
Blacks, and Asians are less likely to exchange favors with neighbors than are Whites, even after 
controlling for income and urban location.  Native citizens born abroad, naturalized citizens, and non-
citizens are all less likely to help their neighbors than citizens born in the US.  The inclination to 
exchange favors mostly increases with educational attainment, although the coefficients are significant 
only for four-year college and advanced university degrees.  The income group most likely to help 
neighbors is the $35,000-50,000 group, an unusual finding when compared to the regressions for the 
other civic engagement variables, although the propensity to help is nearly as large for those with 
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annual incomes over $75,000. The propensity to help neighbors generally rises with age until age 75.   
Metropolitan dwellers are four percentage points less likely to help their neighbors, and married 
individuals are 11 percentage points more likely to exchange neighborly favors than their unmarried 
counterparts.   
The determinants of the gap in helping neighbors between California and US-3 are shown in Table 17 
(more extensive results are in Table 21).  Table 17 shows that differences in demographics account for 
only half of the 9.4 percentage point gap.  The determinants of the gap do not follow the patterns for 
either of the other social civic engagement variables, except in that the largest contributor to gap in 
helping neighbors is the set of citizenship indicators.  The citizenship profile of the state accounts for 
43% of the explained gap in helping neighbors.  The next largest factor is Hispanic ethnicity, at 27% of Q, 
although the impact is significant only at the 10% level.  The racial profile is highly significant but 
accounts for only 8.6% of the explained gap.  Metropolitan status, at 15% of the explained gap, appears 
to be a more important determinant than is race.  None of the other factors are significant at the 5% 
level.   
Since the unexplained component, U, accounts for almost half of the total gap, it is interesting to look at 
its largest contributors.  As with political discussion (see section C.1), in California, native citizens born in 
the US are more likely to help their neighbors. By far the largest component of U comes from the 
difference in the constants in the regressions.  Since the constants capture the impact of pure “group 
membership”—e.g., living in California versus living elsewhere, this has the unfortunate implication that 
much of U and Δ remain unexplained by demographics or the differing likelihoods that various 
demographic groups are willing to help their neighbors. 
E. Summary 
The work in this section shows that for most of the civic engagement measures, differences in the 
demographics explain most of the gaps between California and the rest of the country.  For non-
electoral political action, voting, and group membership and leadership, the decomposition of the gaps 
shows that differences in demographics alone explain more than 100% of the gap in each case. For these 
measures, at least, seekers of why California lags in civic engagement need look no further than the 
demographic and economic make-up of the state.  In fact, for these measures California’s demographics 
would cause even larger gaps than actually observed, but for mitigating unexplained differences in the 
propensity of the state’s residents to engage.  The two exceptions to this observed result are political 
discussion and helping neighbors, for which differences in demographics explain 37% and 51% of the 
California gap, respectively.  The importance of the unexplained factors is relatively larger here, and 
indeed it is only for these two measures that the unexplained parts of the gaps are statistically 
significant.35 
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 As shown by the confidence intervals for the unexplained gap (U) for the dependent variables Discuss Politics  in 
Table 20 and Help Neighbor in Table 21, which do not span zero. 
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There is some regularity among the individual determinants of why California lags the rest of the nation 
in various measures of civic engagement.  There are also some differences among the measures.  The 
most important regularity is that ethnicity, race, and citizenship explain much of the California gaps.   
First, consider the political measures of civic engagement.  Hispanics are less politically engaged, by the 
measures examined, and the greater presence of Hispanics in California accounts for 18 to 40% of the 
explained part of the gaps in political civic engagement, depending on the measure examined.  Asian 
Americans are far less likely to engage politically, and their larger numbers in the state are the primary 
reason why racial factors altogether account for 20 to 133% of the explained gaps.  Blacks are less likely 
to engage by the non-electoral measures, but were more likely to vote than others in 2008 (when, of 
course, a multiracial candidate who self-identified as African-American was on the presidential ballot).    
That there are fewer Blacks in California contributed (along with the larger impact of Asians) to the small 
voting gap.  Individuals with citizenship gained by means other than being born in the US are generally 
less politically engaged, and their greater prevalence explains between 21 and 78% of Q.  The only other 
factor that was a consistently significant determinant of the political engagement gaps was education.  
California’s lower education profile than elsewhere widened the gaps for the non-electoral measures, 
although by smaller amounts than the “big three” factors of ethnicity, race, and citizenship.  When 
restricting attention to those eligible to vote, however, the state’s higher education profile acted to 
narrow the voting gap. 
The picture is more mixed when looking at the measures of social civic engagement, although ethnicity, 
race, and citizenship typically still are large, albeit sometimes statistically insignificant, determinants.  
The regressions show that while Hispanics appear to be less socially engaged, the significance of the 
estimates is tenuous.  The borderline significance of the regression coefficients leads to the impacts of 
the Hispanic variable on the gaps also being insignificant, although the size of the impact ranges from 11 
to 27% of the explained gaps.  Asian Americans are less likely to engage socially as well as politically.  
The impact of Asians composes again makes up the largest part of the total impact of the racial factors, 
and race accounts for between 9 and 21% of Q.  The impacts of citizenship on the gaps in social 
engagement generally stem from naturalized citizens and non-citizens, both of whom are less likely to 
engage.  The larger numbers of residents who are not native citizens in California leads to total 
contributions of the citizenship factors of 35 to 43% of Q.  Unlike race and ethnicity, the impacts of 
citizenship as a whole are significant for all three social measures.  The impact of the other demographic 
factors varies greatly across the measures.  The tendency of metro-dwellers to be less likely to be 
socially engaged leads to significant determinants of Q for only two of the three measures.  Similarly, 
education and income explain some of the gap for some measures but not others. 
IV. Is Civic Engagement in California Distinctive? 
California is not the only large state with lower civic engagement than the US as a whole.  Previous work 
has found that New York and Texas, the next two largest states by population, also lag in many of the 
same areas of civic engagement that California does (NCOC et al., 2010).  The comparison in section II 
above also confirms this.  A natural question to ask, therefore, is whether these other large states lag for 
the same reasons as uncovered for California in section III.  In particular, we have found that race, 
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ethnicity, and citizenship account for much of the California gaps—is the same true for New York and 
Texas?  Or, to paraphrase Tolstoy,36 is every lagging state disengaged in its own way? 
We repeat the methodology of section III here, in brief, for New York and Texas.  To begin with, 
examination of the 2009 demographic characteristics of the states in Table 8 shows that California 
appears to be somewhat more similar to New York than Texas.  Like California, more than one-fifth of 
New York’s population is non-White, although the latter has relatively more Blacks and fewer Asians 
than the former.  Texas is 85% White, with Blacks making up the majority of the non-Whites.  California 
and Texas have similar Hispanic contingents, about one-third of total population, while New York has 
only 15%.  New York and Texas share with California a lower incidence of native citizens born in the US, 
although native-born citizens are least prevalent in California and most prevalent in Texas.  At the low 
end of the educational attainment, Texas shares with California large numbers of residents without a 
high school degree or with only a high school degree.  At the higher end, California looks more like New 
York than Texas, with more four-year college graduates and above than the national average, while 
Texas is below average in this regard.  Income is higher in both California and New York than in the 
nation as a whole, but Texas has a lower proportion of its households in the higher income category.  All 
three states are much more metropolitan than the rest of the US.  The relative youthfulness of California 
is not mirrored in either New York or Texas.  Marital rates are unusually low in New York.37   
The relationships between the outcome measures of civic engagement and the demographic 
explanatory variables used to compute the explained part of the gaps are the same as described in 
section III.  That is, the regressions for the reference group US-3 as reported in Table 10 and Table 14 are 
still the relevant source for the coefficients used in equation (1), even when NY or TX replaces CA in the 
equation.   
We can turn then immediately to the decompositions of the gaps in civic engagement for New York and 
Texas.  The breakdown of the gaps for the measures of political civic engagement is in Table 18, with 
more detailed information available in Table 22 and Table 23.  For political discussion and non-electoral 
political acts, the gaps in New York and Texas are not as large as in California and are not big enough to 
be significant in the sample.  For these two measures, the same factors of ethnicity, race, and citizenship 
that were the most important for California also are the largest explanations of the New York gap.  For 
Texas, ethnicity is an important factor, as in California, but the relatively poor education profile of Texas 
is also a major reason for the gaps in the state.  Citizenship is also important factor for Political Acts in 
Texas. The voting gaps are larger in New York and Texas than in California.  For voting, income joins 
ethnicity, race, and citizenship in New York as the predominant factors, while in Texas ethnicity, 
education, and age are the major causes of the explained gap.  Overall, then, the big three factors of 
ethnicity, race, and citizenship are responsible for much of the gaps in these other states, but are joined 
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 “Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way” (Leo Tolstoy, in the opening to 
Anna Karenina). 
37
 We investigated to see if Florida, the fourth most populous state, would be a better comparison state than 
either New York or Texas.  However, with the exception of having more Hispanics than average, Florida’s 
demographic profile (in terms of the important factors of race, income, education) is more similar to the rest of the 
US than to California, New York, and Texas. 
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to other factors (income in New York, education in Texas) that play relatively larger roles than in 
California. 
The summary decomposition of the gaps in social civic engagement is in Table 19, with more detailed 
information available in Table 24 and Table 25.  Roughly speaking, there are some similarities among the 
three states in the general importance of some factors, particularly ethnicity and citizenship. However, 
New York’s gaps in social engagement are also driven by its low marital rates while education plays 
more of a role in creating Texas’s gaps.  One large difference shows up in the importance of race, which 
is significant for California’s gaps but not for these two other states.  The difference appears to stem 
from the large proportion of Asians—and their lower social civic engagement—in the California 
population that are not present in the other states.  In sum, as with political engagement, social 
engagement lags in New York and Texas for some reasons common to the three largest states (ethnicity, 
citizenship) and for other reasons unique to the state (low rates of marriage in New York, low 
educational attainment in Texas). 
 
V. Conclusions 
The empirical examination of the determinants of civic engagement in California shows that 
participation in the state differs from engagement elsewhere in the US in degree but not in kind.  That is, 
for the most part people with similar socioeconomic profiles are as likely to be civically engaged in 
California as elsewhere.  For involvement in non-electoral political activities, voting, group membership, 
and group leadership, California’s lagging participation rates are fully explained by the differing 
demographics in the state.  For two measures we consider, political discussion and exchanging favors 
with neighbors, California’s unique demographics explain only half to one-third of the participation gap.  
However, even for these two measures, Hispanics, non-whites, and residents with citizenship status 
other than native born in the US are not significantly less civically engaged than elsewhere.38  Perhaps 
the good news for those seeking to improve civic engagement in the state is that the uniqueness of 
California’s challenge stems more from who lives here than from deficient opportunities to apply 
individuals’ resources toward participation or from generally underdeveloped recruitment networks.   
It may be scant comfort to know that California faces the same task as elsewhere in equipping, 
motivating, and recruiting minorities and those with nontraditional citizenship status.  Nonetheless, one 
implication is that lessons learned in other parts of the country about increasing civic engagement may 
be more or less directly applicable to California.  We conclude by mentioning three promising avenues 
to improve social capital and civic engagement:  municipal leadership, civic education, and e-
engagement. 
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Local and municipal leadership to improve civic engagement 
Community and municipal leaders may play an important role in encouraging civic engagement among 
groups with historically low participation rates, such as immigrants.  Some initiatives aim at providing 
local leaders with practical information on how to encourage participation in public decision making. For 
example, the Institute for Local Government in California and the National League of Cities make 
available publications and programs designed to help local officials reach out to the immigrant 
community and encourage civic participation.39 
New or rejuvenated forms of democratic governance have received much attention in recent years. 
Leighninger (2009) characterizes democratic governance as providing a “new relationship between 
citizens and government…by governing communities in participatory, deliberative, collaborative ways.”  
Such governance structure can be temporary, as in day-long exercises in deliberative democracy focused 
on a specific community issue, or permanent, such as standing neighborhood councils.  Delli Carpini, 
Cook, and Jacobs (2004) review empirical studies on various experiments in deliberative democracy, 
which general find positive outcomes on civic engagement and political outcomes.   
Civic education to stimulate civic involvement 
A certain amount of civic knowledge is necessary for some forms of (primarily political) civic 
engagement.  Without understanding of the powers and limitations of various elected offices in the US, 
how the government works, or even how to register to vote, the motivation to vote or to contact public 
officials may be low.  Recent research indicates that civic knowledge indeed promotes political 
participation (Galston, 2007).  Whether civic knowledge can be taught is another matter, and much of 
the older empirical work in the field came to the consensus that civic education has no effect on civic 
knowledge.  However, one large-scale study of civic education of 14-year-olds in 28 democratic 
countries found that instruction in and use of democratic practices in the classroom was positively 
correlated with the students’ knowledge of democracy and their intention to vote (Torney-Purta et al., 
2001).  Other recent research has found particular pedagogical interventions that significantly improve 
participants’ understanding of politics (Galston, 2007).  Two examples are the We the People civic 
education program run by the Center for Civic Education (Atherton, 2000) and the non-governmental 
Kids Voting USA citizenship development program (Chaffee, 2000).  Other work also shows that better 
civic education leads to action.  Various educational interventions have been shown to improve social 
capital and civic engagement, particularly among minority communities (e.g., Michael et al., 2007). 
The Internet and the promise of e-engagement 
The internet potentially provides a low cost way to engage with the community and political life, and 
thus may be a democratizing and equalizing force (Lin, 2001).  Some researchers see the Internet and 
cyberspace as fostering resources embedded in social networks to such a degree that they claim that 
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 See, for example, Greg Keidan (2008), A Local Official’s Guide to Immigrant Civic Engagement Institute for Local 
Government, available online (for personal use only) at http://www.ca-ilg.org/sites/ilgbackup.org/files/2008_-
_Guide_to_Immigrant_Civic_Engagement-w.pdf; and Matt Leighninger and Bonnie C. Mann. (2010),Civic 
Engagement and Recent Immigrant Communities: A planning guide for local officials and other community leaders, 
National League of Cities Center for Research & Innovation, available online at 
http://www.nlc.org/file%20library/find%20city%20solutions/research%20innovation/governance-civic/discussion-
guide-civic-engagement-immigrants-gid-jun10-pdf.pdf.   
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social capital has actually been increasing during the same period Putnam claims it diminished (Lin, 
2001, ch. 12). Perhaps the internet and social media will play a role in changing the nature of civic 
engagement in America for all economic classes.   
Existing research has found a positive association between internet use and some forms of civic 
engagement, such as voting, contributing to political campaigns, and contacting government officials.40  
Consumption of online news has been shown to increase civic engagement, even when controlling for 
selection bias in who goes online (Mossberger et al. 2008).  The Pew Internet and American Life Project 
has also studied such effects, finding that the internet has not reduced the income gap in terms of active 
civic participation, such as signing a petition (Smith, et al., 2009).  However, they are optimistic 
regarding the effects of social media, which are adopted disproportionately by the young. The Pew 
Report currently finds that about one-fifth internet users have posted material online about political or 
social issues or used a social networking site for civic engagement.  Both forums, Twitter and Facebook, 
have exploded with blogs and social commentary, so research on these mediums will impact elections, 
political discussion, and community networks will be needed.  However, the results are too early to 
determine the long term effects of the internet and social media on civic engagement.   
Just as the internet can help alleviate but is not a panacea for disparities in education or health care 
among various groups in society, neither does cyberspace provide the final solution for deficient 
resources and social capital.  It remains to be seen whether virtual forms of engagement and contact 
with others in the anonymity culture of cyberspace will foster the same sort of trust that contributes to 
social capital as with face to face meetings (Kling, 1996).  Some evidence is encouraging in this regard. 
Review of particular pilot project in Boston using a virtual world to engage citizens in urban planning 
found that it allowed “previously disempowered individuals … to form politically powerful groups” in 
cyberspace (Gordon and Koo, 2008, p.204). Monforti and Marichal (2011) find that acquiring digital skills 
improved generalized trust among Hispanics and blacks.41 Some commentators question whether online 
communities will sap the health of physical communities (Kling, 1996) or “cyberbalkanize” society by 
encouraging communication only with like-minded people (Putnam, 2000; Sunstein, 2001).   Given that 
evidence indicates that it is rare for individuals on the Internet to only be exposed to political 
perspectives with which they agree (Kahne et al., 2011), perhaps a more important concern is that not 
all groups in the US have equal access to the internet and broadband (Mossberger et al., 2008).  So, until 
access diffuses evenly throughout society, the internet may accentuate differences in citizenship, digital 
or “real world,” between groups.   
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Tables for the Main Text 
 
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics and Comparisons for Political Discussion, 2009 
How often were politics discussed when 




   Few times per week or more 34.9 (34.0,35.9) 
 At least once per month but less than weekly 36.3 (35.3,37.2) 
 Not at all 28.8 (27.9,29.8) 
 
    US without CA/NY/TX 
   Few times per week or more 36.4 (35.4,37.5) 
 At least once per month but less than weekly 36.8 (35.7,37.9) 
 Not at all 26.8 (25.8,27.8) 
 
    California 
  
0.000* 
Few times per week or more 27.4 (24.8,30.3) 0.000** 
At least once per month but less than weekly 35.6 (32.8,38.6) 0.469** 
Not at all 36.9 (33.9,40.1) 0.000** 
    New York 
  
0.088* 
Few times per week or more 33.4 (29.4,37.7) 0.164** 
At least once per month but less than weekly 34.9 (31.0,38.9) 0.350** 
Not at all 31.7 (27.6,36.2) 0.028** 
    Texas 
  
0.016* 
Few times per week or more 33.4 (29.4,37.6) 0.161** 
Once per month or more 33.4 (29.5,37.6) 0.114** 
Not at all 33.2 (29.1,37.5) 0.004** 
* P-value for the joint hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without CA, 
NY, and TX), all categories. 
** P-value for the simple hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without 
CA, NY, and TX), only for the row category. 
Table notes:  The denominator for the estimated proportions does not include respondents who did 
not answer or answered “don’t know”.  Each subpopulation is for 2009 and excludes individuals under 




Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics and Comparisons for Political Involvement, 2009 
Have you contacted a public official or 




   Yes 17.0 (16.3,17.7) 
 No  81.5 (80.8,82.3) 
 No response/Refused/Don’t know 1.5 (1.3,1.8) 
 
    US without CA/NY/TX 
   Yes 17.7 (16.9,18.5) 
 No  80.9 (80.1,81.7) 
 No response/Refused/Don’t know 1.4 (1.2,1.7) 
 
    California 
  
0.005* 
Yes 14.2 (12.3,16.3) 0.001** 
No  84.6 (82.4,86.6) 0.001** 
No response/Refused/Don’t know 1.3 (0.8,2.1) 0.618** 
    New York 
  
0.086* 
Yes 15.5 (13.0,18.5) 0.147** 
No  81.7 (78.6,84.6) 0.598** 
No response/Refused/Don’t know 2.7 (1.6,4.5) 0.076** 
    Texas 
  
0.489* 
Yes 15.8 (13.2,18.9) 0.232** 
No  82.7 (79.5,85.5) 0.261** 
No response/Refused/Don’t know 1.5 (0.7,3.0) 0.958** 
* P-value for the joint hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without CA, 
NY, and TX), all categories. 
** P-value for the simple hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without 
CA, NY, and TX), only for the row category. 




Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics and Comparisons for Voting, 2008 Presidential Election 




   Voted 63.6 (63.2,64.1) 
 Did not vote 22.6 (22.2,23.0) 
 No response/Refused/Don’t know 13.8 (13.4,14.1) 
 
    US without CA/NY/TX 
   Voted 64.8 (64.3,65.3) 
 Did not vote 22.0 (21.6,22.5) 
 No response/Refused/Don’t know 13.2 (12.8,13.6) 
 
    California 
  
0.001* 
Voted 63.4 (61.8,64.9) 0.089** 
Did not vote 20.9 (19.7,22.2) 0.098** 
No response/Refused/Don’t know 15.7 (14.4,17.0) 0.000** 
    New York 
  
0.000* 
Voted 58.8 (56.7,60.9) 0.000** 
Did not vote 22.0 (20.3,23.7) 0.913** 
No response/Refused/Don’t know 19.2 (17.5,21.1) 0.000** 
    Texas 
  
0.000* 
Voted 56.1 (54.2,58.0) 0.000** 
Did not vote 31.2 (29.5,32.9) 0.000** 
No response/Refused/Don’t know 12.7 (11.4,14.2) 0.569** 
* P-value for the joint hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without CA, 
NY, and TX), all categories. 
** P-value for the simple hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without 
CA, NY, and TX), only for the row category. 
Table notes:  Each subpopulation is for 2008 and excludes noncitizens and individuals under 18 years 




Table 4:  Descriptive Statistics and Comparisons for Group Leadership, 2009 
Have you been an officer or served on a 




   Yes 9.7 (9.2,10.2) 
 
No  88.3 (87.7,88.9) 
 No response/Refused/Don’t know 2.0 (1.8,2.3) 
 
    US without CA/NY/TX 
   Yes 10.4 (9.8,11.0) 
 No  87.7 (87.0,88.3) 
 No response/Refused/Don’t know 1.9 (1.7,2.2) 
 
    California 
  
0.001* 
Yes 7.5 (6.3,9.0) 0.000** 
No  90.6 (89.0,92.0) 0.001** 
No response/Refused/Don’t know 1.9 (1.3,2.8) 0.950** 
    New York 
  
0.000* 
Yes 5.8 (4.3,7.7) 0.000** 
No  90.8 (88.4,92.8) 0.006** 
No response/Refused/Don’t know 3.4 (2.2,5.2) 0.052** 
    Texas 
  
0.774* 
Yes 9.6 (7.5,12.2) 0.508** 
No  88.6 (85.9,90.9) 0.475** 
No response/Refused/Don’t know 1.8 (0.9,3.4) 0.811** 
* P-value for the joint hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without CA, 
NY, and TX), all categories. 
** P-value for the simple hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without 
CA, NY, and TX), only for the row category. 




Table 5:  Descriptive Statistics and Comparisons for Group Membership, 2009 




   Yes 35.5 (34.5,36.4) 
 No  63.0 (62.0,63.9) 
 No response/Refused/Don’t know 1.6 (1.4,1.8) 
 
    US without CA/NY/TX 
   Yes 36.4 (35.3,37.4) 
 No  62.2 (61.2,63.3) 
 No response/Refused/Don’t know 1.4 (1.2,1.7) 
 
    California 
  
0.107* 
Yes 33.0 (30.2,36.0) 0.035** 
No  65.4 (62.4,68.2) 0.044** 
No response/Refused/Don’t know 1.6 (1.0,2.4) 0.715** 
    New York 
  
0.034* 
Yes 32.7 (28.9,36.7) 0.078** 
No  64.4 (60.3,68.3) 0.309** 
No response/Refused/Don’t know 2.9 (1.8,4.7) 0.035** 
    Texas 
  
0.265* 
Yes 33.0 (29.1,37.1) 0.107** 
No  65.4 (61.2,69.3) 0.138** 
No response/Refused/Don’t know 1.7 (0.8,3.2) 0.699** 
* P-value for the joint hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without CA, 
NY, and TX), all categories. 
** P-value for the simple hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without 
CA, NY, and TX), only for the row category. 




Table 6:  Descriptive Statistics and Comparisons for Dining with Family, 2009 




   Weekly 87.9 (87.1,88.6) 
 Monthly 7.5 (7.0,8.2) 
 Not at all 4.6 (4.1,5.1) 
 
    US without CA/NY/TX 
   Weekly 88.1 (87.3,89.0) 
 Monthly 7.6 (6.9,8.2) 
 Not at all 4.3 (3.8,4.9) 
 
    California 
  
0.519* 
Weekly 86.7 (84.1,88.9) 0.255** 
Monthly 8.3 (6.7,10.3) 0.431** 
Not at all 5.0 (3.7,6.8) 0.405** 
    New York 
  
0.098* 
Weekly 88.7 (85.2,91.5) 0.726** 
Monthly 5.4 (3.7,8.0) 0.058** 
Not at all 5.9 (3.8,9.0) 0.240** 
    Texas 
  
0.584* 
Weekly 86.7 (83.0,89.6) 0.390** 
Monthly 7.9 (5.7,10.8) 0.788** 
Not at all 5.4 (3.7,8.0) 0.319** 
* P-value for the joint hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without CA, 
NY, and TX), all categories. 
** P-value for the simple hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without 
CA, NY, and TX), only for the row category. 
Table notes:  The denominator for the estimated proportions does not include respondents who did 
not answer or answered "don’t know". Each subpopulation is for 2009 and excludes individuals under 




Table 7:  Descriptive Statistics and Comparisons for Helping Neighbors, 2009 
How often did you and your neighbors 




   Weekly 15.4 (14.8,16.2) 
 Monthly 40.8 (39.8,41.8) 
 Not at all 43.8 (42.7,44.8) 
 
    US without CA/NY/TX 
   Weekly 16.0 (15.3,16.8) 
 Monthly 42.1 (41.1,43.2) 
 Not at all 41.8 (40.7,43.0) 
 
    California 
  
0.000* 
Weekly 13.0 (11.1,15.1) 0.005** 
Monthly 35.9 (33.0,38.9) 0.000** 
Not at all 51.2 (48.0,54.4) 0.000** 
    New York 
  
0.066* 
Weekly 13.9 (11.4,16.9) 0.144** 
Monthly 38.9 (34.9,43.1) 0.138** 
Not at all 47.2 (42.7,51.7) 0.023** 
    Texas 
  
0.043* 
Weekly 14.9 (12.2,18.2) 0.483** 
Monthly 37.3 (33.3,41.5) 0.027** 
Not at all 47.8 (43.2,52.4) 0.027** 
* P-value for the joint hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without CA, 
NY, and TX), all categories. 
** P-value for the simple hypothesis test of equal proportions between the state and the US (without 
CA, NY, and TX), only for the row category. 
Table notes:  The denominator for the estimated proportions does not include respondents who did 
not answer or answered “don’t know”. Each subpopulation is for 2009 and excludes individuals under 




Table 8:  Demographics Characteristics for the 2009 Subpopulations 
 
California New York Texas Rest of the US 
Hispanic 35.6% 15.0% 33.1% 8.3% 
Race 
    White 76.5% 77.9% 84.6% 81.8% 
Black 5.9% 15.1% 10.8% 12.5% 
Native American 1.0% 0.3% 0.9% 0.8% 
Asian/Pacific Islander 14.7% 5.2% 3.3% 3.6% 
Multiracial 1.9% 1.5% 0.4% 1.3% 
Citizenship 
    Native, born in US 61.9% 72.0% 80.8% 88.2% 
Native, born in PR etc. 0.1% 2.8% 0.0% 0.7% 
Native, born abroad 1.7% 0.4% 1.0% 0.7% 
Naturalized citizen 18.1% 14.3% 5.8% 4.8% 
Not a citizen 18.2% 10.6% 12.4% 5.6% 
Education 
    Less than high school 17.9% 11.4% 18.3% 11.3% 
High school 23.8% 30.8% 29.8% 31.8% 
Some college, no degree 21.9% 15.3% 20.3% 19.3% 
2-year college degree 8.6% 9.6% 7.1% 9.3% 
4-year college degree 20.3% 21.5% 17.7% 18.5% 
Advanced degree 7.6% 11.4% 6.7% 9.8% 
Income 
    (missing) 12.5% 19.3% 12.9% 14.4% 
Less than $35K 26.6% 27.0% 33.2% 30.0% 
$35K to $50K 10.8% 10.5% 13.8% 13.0% 
$50K to $75K 18.8% 12.4% 19.8% 17.7% 
More than $75K 31.3% 30.8% 20.4% 24.9% 
In a Metro Area 98.4% 92.1% 92.2% 79.9% 
Age 
    18-25 15.7% 14.4% 12.7% 14.0% 
26-35 20.3% 17.7% 23.3% 16.9% 
36-45 17.9% 18.4% 18.9% 18.1% 
46-55 19.3% 19.2% 16.9% 19.6% 
56-65 13.7% 14.9% 13.4% 15.0% 
66-75 7.5% 8.1% 9.6% 9.2% 
76+ 5.6% 7.3% 5.2% 7.2% 
Gender 
    Male 49.1% 47.4% 48.6% 48.3% 
Female 50.9% 52.6% 51.4% 51.7% 
Married 52.7% 48.6% 56.1% 54.5% 
Notes:  Each subpopulation is restricted to individuals aged 18 years or higher.  The survey weights are 
employed in the estimates. 
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Table 9:  Demographics Characteristics for the 2008 Subpopulations (from the Voting sample) 
 
California New York Texas Rest of the US 
Hispanic 23.8% 10.5% 29.9% 5.4% 
Race     
White 77.2% 77.7% 83.5% 83.2% 
Black 7.5% 15.2% 12.2% 12.5% 
Native American 1.0% 0.2% 0.5% 0.8% 
Asian/Pacific Islander 12.6% 5.8% 2.5% 2.4% 
Multiracial 1.7% 1.0% 1.3% 1.2% 
Citizenship     
Native, born in US 78.3% 81.3% 91.0% 93.4% 
Native, born in PR etc. 0.2% 2.6% 0.2% 0.7% 
Native, born abroad 1.3% 1.1% 1.7% 0.8% 
Naturalized citizen 20.2% 15.0% 7.0% 5.1% 
Not a citizen 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Education     
Less than high school 10.5% 11.4% 14.6% 10.9% 
High school 24.4% 30.2% 31.0% 33.0% 
Some college, no degree 23.5% 17.2% 22.6% 20.1% 
2-year college degree 10.3% 9.9% 7.6% 9.0% 
4-year college degree 21.2% 19.8% 17.5% 18.1% 
Advanced degree 10.2% 11.6% 6.6% 8.9% 
Income     
(missing) 18.7% 29.4% 14.4% 20.7% 
Less than $35K 20.9% 20.5% 31.6% 25.6% 
$35K to $50K 10.9% 10.1% 12.2% 11.7% 
$50K to $75K 15.4% 14.1% 16.4% 16.7% 
More than $75K 34.2% 25.9% 25.4% 25.2% 
In a Metro Area 97.5% 90.1% 87.9% 79.8% 
Age     
18-25 15.4% 14.9% 16.1% 14.0% 
26-35 17.0% 16.0% 18.4% 16.2% 
36-45 18.1% 17.0% 17.9% 18.1% 
46-55 19.2% 18.2% 19.0% 20.2% 
56-65 14.9% 15.6% 12.9% 15.2% 
66-75 8.4% 9.9% 9.1% 9.0% 
76+ 7.0% 8.4% 6.6% 7.4% 
Gender     
Male 48.4% 47.0% 48.0% 48.0% 
Female 51.6% 53.0% 52.1% 52.0% 
Married 53.4% 51.7% 54.9% 55.6% 
Notes:  Each subpopulation is restricted to individuals aged 18 years or higher who are eligible (but not 
necessarily registered) to vote.  The survey weights are employed in the estimates. 
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Table 10:  Reference Group (US-3) Regressions for the Political Civic Engagement Variables 
 Y = Discuss Politics 
 
Y = Political Acts  Y = Voted 
 
Coef. S.E.   Coef. S.E.   Coef. S.E. 
Hispanic -0.048** 0.024  -0.029** 0.015  -0.028** 0.012 
Black -0.040** 0.017  -0.066*** 0.011  0.098*** 0.008 
Native American -0.016 0.050  0.012 0.035  -0.067*** 0.024 
Asian -0.182*** 0.028  -0.119*** 0.016  -0.153*** 0.017 
Multiracial -0.011 0.040  0.079** 0.036  0.004 0.020 
Born in PR/other -0.067 0.058  -0.071*** 0.024  -0.094*** 0.031 
Native, born abroad 0.118** 0.053  0.016 0.041  -0.038 0.024 
Naturalized citizen -0.055** 0.025  -0.096*** 0.015  -0.082*** 0.012 
Non-citizen -0.009 0.027  -0.079*** 0.014  
†
  
High school 0.039** 0.015  0.038*** 0.008  0.155*** 0.007 
Some college 0.088*** 0.017  0.112*** 0.010  0.282*** 0.008 
2-year college 0.132*** 0.020  0.118*** 0.013  0.299*** 0.009 
4-year college 0.167*** 0.018  0.195*** 0.012  0.356*** 0.008 
Advanced degree 0.186*** 0.021  0.250*** 0.016  0.377*** 0.009 
Income: < $35K -0.019 0.017  0.018 0.011  0.136*** 0.008 
Income: $35-50K 0.015 0.021  0.050*** 0.014  0.187*** 0.009 
Income: $50-75K 0.014 0.020  0.048*** 0.013  0.222*** 0.008 
Income: > $75K 0.076*** 0.019  0.061*** 0.013  0.249*** 0.008 
In a metro area 0.024* 0.013  -0.010 0.009  0.005 0.006 
Age: 26-35 -0.017 0.018  0.024* 0.013  0.022*** 0.008 
Age: 36-45 -0.016 0.018  0.036*** 0.012  0.067*** 0.008 
Age: 46-55 0.038** 0.017  0.077*** 0.012  0.109*** 0.008 
Age: 56-65 0.073*** 0.019  0.109*** 0.014  0.166*** 0.008 
Age: 66-75 0.028 0.021  0.110*** 0.015  0.233*** 0.009 
Age: >75 0.012 0.021  0.036** 0.014  0.230*** 0.010 
Female -0.038*** 0.007  -0.012** 0.006  0.040*** 0.003 
Married 0.035*** 0.011  0.002 0.008  0.074*** 0.005 
 
        
Subpopulation obs. 16,969  17,361  77,504 
Strata 294  294  295 
F statistic (d.o.f.) 20.3 (27,62931)   44.3 (27,62931)   316.6 (26,58364)  
F stat. p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000 
R squared 0.051  0.085  0.149 
*** significant at the 1% level.  **significant at the 5% level.  ** significant at the 10% level.   
Notes:  Each column presents the results from separate regressions, where the dependent variable is as 
noted in the column heading.  Regressions are weighted and the linearized standard errors account for 
the complex survey design and are robust to heteroskedasticity.  
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Table 11:  Decomposition of California’s Gap in Political Discussion 
California average 27.43 
Gap between California and US-3 (percentage points) 9.01 
 95% confidence interval for the gap (6.8,11.3) 
Percentage of gap explained by differences in demographics (100*Q/) 37.3 
Percentage of the quantity effect (Q) explained by…   
 Ethnicity (Hispanic) 39.6** 
 Race 52.6*** 
 Citizenship 21.1* 
 Education 9.2*** 
 Income -15.8* 
 Metro/non-metro -13.5* 
 Age profile 6.8 
 Gender -1.5 
 Marital Status 1.6 
*** significant at the 1% level.  **significant at the 5% level.  ** significant at the 10% level.   
Notes:  The mean of the response variable for California and US-3 differs from the statistics reported in 
section II because survey responses coded as N/A, “refused,” and “don’t know” are dropped from the 
sample here.   Percentages given for a category of variables is calculated as the sum of the contributions 
to the explained gap from each demographic variable in the category, multiplied by 100 and divided by 
.  Significance stars are for the joint hypothesis that all the estimates of the explained portion of the 
gap for the group of demographic variables indicated are zero.  The confidence interval accounts for 
survey design effects. 
Table 12:  Decomposition of California’s Gap in Non-Electoral Political Action 
California average 14.33 
Gap between California and US-3 (percentage points) 3.59 
 95% confidence interval for the gap (1.4,5.8) 
Percentage of gap explained by differences in demographics (100*Q/) 123.5 
Percentage of the quantity effect (Q) explained by… 
  Ethnicity (Hispanic) 18.3** 
 Race 19.2*** 
 Citizenship 50.1*** 
 Education 7.3*** 
 Income -6.1* 
 Metro/non-metro 4.3 
 Age profile 7.1* 
 Gender -0.3 
 Marital Status 0.1 
*** significant at the 1% level.  **significant at the 5% level.  ** significant at the 10% level.   





Table 13:  Decomposition of California’s Gap in Voting for 2008 
California average 63.38 
Gap between California and US-3 (percentage points) 1.41 
 95% confidence interval for the gap (-0.2,3.0) 
Percentage of gap explained by differences in demographics (100*Q/) 109.8 
Percentage of the quantity effect (Q) explained by… 
  Ethnicity (Hispanic) 33.4** 
 Race 132.8*** 
 Citizenship 78.5*** 
 Education -101.0*** 
 Income -73.4*** 
 Metro/non-metro -5.4 
 Age profile 23.7* 
 Gender 1.1 
 Marital Status 10.4*** 
*** significant at the 1% level.  **significant at the 5% level.  ** significant at the 10% level.   
See notes to Table 11, except that survey responses coded as N/A, “refused,” and “don’t know” are not 




Table 14:  Reference Group (US-3) Regressions for the Social Civic Engagement Variables 
   
Y = Group 
Leadership  
Y = Group 
Participation  
Y = Help Neighbor 
 
Coef. S.E.   Coef. S.E.   Coef. S.E. 
Hispanic -0.013 0.010  -0.044* 0.023  -0.047* 0.026 
Black -0.011 0.008  0.037** 0.017  -0.095*** 0.019 
Native American -0.024 0.022  -0.039 0.047  -0.051 0.058 
Asian -0.070*** 0.014  -0.067** 0.031  -0.089*** 0.034 
Multiracial 0.008 0.025  0.041 0.041  0.032 0.042 
Born in PR/other -0.021 0.020  -0.068 0.045  0.073 0.074 
Native born abroad 0.005 0.033  0.029 0.052  -0.125** 0.050 
Naturalized citizen -0.065*** 0.012  -0.063** 0.026  -0.061** 0.029 
Non-citizen -0.028** 0.011  -0.068*** 0.024  -0.083*** 0.029 
High school 0.019*** 0.005  0.078*** 0.014  0.005 0.017 
Some college 0.067*** 0.008  0.185*** 0.016  0.030 0.019 
2-year college 0.075*** 0.010  0.185*** 0.019  0.005 0.021 
4-year college 0.117*** 0.009  0.293*** 0.017  0.047** 0.020 
Advanced degree 0.196*** 0.013  0.371*** 0.020  0.050** 0.022 
Income: < $35K -0.013 0.008  0.008 0.015  0.007 0.019 
Income: $35-50K 0.006 0.011  0.048** 0.019  0.077*** 0.022 
Income: $50-75K 0.012 0.011  0.060*** 0.018  0.043** 0.021 
Income: > $75K 0.050*** 0.011  0.107*** 0.018  0.073*** 0.020 
In a metro area -0.032*** 0.008  -0.012 0.012  -0.039*** 0.013 
Age: 26-35 -0.007 0.008  -0.006 0.017  0.084*** 0.019 
Age: 36-45 0.018** 0.009  0.059*** 0.017  0.148*** 0.019 
Age: 46-55 0.048*** 0.009  0.025 0.016  0.160*** 0.018 
Age: 56-65 0.062*** 0.010  0.030* 0.018  0.158*** 0.020 
Age: 66-75 0.098*** 0.012  0.114*** 0.020  0.192*** 0.022 
Age: >75 0.049*** 0.011  0.061*** 0.020  0.101*** 0.023 
Female 0.014*** 0.005  0.034*** 0.007  0.003 0.007 
Married 0.023*** 0.006  0.097*** 0.010  0.109*** 0.012 
 
        
Subpopulation obs. 17,268  17,346  16,950 
Strata 294  294  294 
F statistic (d.o.f.) 31.7 (27,62931)   50.1 (27,62931)   21.4 (27,62931)  
F stat. p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000 
R squared 0.075   0.108   0.062 
*significant at the 10% level.  **significant at the 5% level.  ***significant at the 1% level.     




Table 15:  Decomposition of California’s Gap in Group Leadership 
California average 7.64 
Gap between California and US-3 (percentage points) 2.97 
 95% confidence interval for the gap (1.5,4.5) 
Percentage of gap explained by differences in demographics (100*Q/) 108.6 
Percentage of the quantity effect (Q) explained by… 
  Ethnicity (Hispanic) 11.4 
 Race 21.9*** 
 Citizenship 37.6*** 
 Education 8.7*** 
 Income -10.9* 
 Metro/non-metro 18.7*** 
 Age profile 11.1** 
 Gender 0.4 
 Marital Status 1.2 
*** significant at the 1% level.  **significant at the 5% level.  ** significant at the 10% level.   
See notes to Table 11. 
 
 
Table 16:  Decomposition of California’s Gap in Group Participation 
California average 33.57 
Gap between California and US-3 (percentage points) 3.31 
 95% confidence interval for the gap (0.2,6.4) 
Percentage of gap explained by differences in demographics (100*Q/) 137.8 
Percentage of the quantity effect (Q) explained by… 
  Ethnicity (Hispanic) 26.4* 
 Race 21.1* 
 Citizenship 35.7** 
 Education 13.2*** 
 Income -13.3** 
 Metro/non-metro 4.8 
 Age profile 8.1* 
 Gender 0.7 
 Marital Status 3.3 
*** significant at the 1% level.  **significant at the 5% level.  ** significant at the 10% level.   




Table 17:  Decomposition of California’s Gap in Helping Neighbors 
California average 48.82 
Gap between California and US-3 (percentage points) 9.35 
 95% confidence interval for the gap (6.0,12.7) 
Percentage of gap explained by differences in demographics (100*Q/) 51.3 
Percentage of the quantity effect (Q) explained by… 
  Ethnicity (Hispanic) 27.0* 
 Race 8.6*** 
 Citizenship 42.8*** 
 Education -0.5 
 Income -6.8* 
 Metro/non-metro 15.1*** 
 Age profile 9.8* 
 Gender 0.1 
 Marital Status 3.9 
*** significant at the 1% level.  **significant at the 5% level.  ** significant at the 10% level.   




Table 18:  Decomposition of New York and Texas’ Gap in Political Civic Engagement 
 
Y = Discuss Politics Y = Political Acts Y = Voted 
 
New York Texas New York Texas New York Texas 
State average 33.42 33.40 15.97 16.07 58.83 56.09 
Gap between the state and US-3 
(percentage points) 3.01 3.03 1.95 1.85 5.96 8.71 
 95% confidence interval for the gap (-0.3,6.4) (-0.3,6.4) (-1.0,4.9) (-1.1,4.8) (3.8,8.1) (6.8,10.6) 
Percentage of gap explained by 
differences in demographics 
(100*Q/) 26.0 75.3 102.4 145.3 36.2 19.6 
Percentage of the quantity effect (Q) 
explained by… 
  














Race 57.8 -7.5 19.8 -4.0 10.3
***
 1.7 































 6.2 4.7 -2.3 -2.3 





Gender 3.7 0.2 0.5 0.0 -1.7 0.0 
Marital Status 23.7
*
 -2.3 0.5 -0.1 13.4
***
 3.2 
*** significant at the 1% level.  **significant at the 5% level.  ** significant at the 10% level.   




Table 19:  Decomposition of New York and Texas’ Gap in Social Civic Engagement 
 
Y = Group Leadership 
Y = Group 
Participation Y = Help Neighbor 
 
New York Texas New York Texas New York Texas 
State average 6.01 9.77 33.67 33.53 52.82 52.25 
Gap between the state and US-3 
(percentage points) 4.60 0.84 3.20 3.35 5.35 5.92 
 95% confidence interval for the gap (2.8,6.4) (-1.5,3.2) (-0.9,7.3) (-0.7,7.4) (0.8,9.9) (1.3,10.5) 
Percentage of gap explained by 
differences in demographics 
(100*Q/) 24.0 262.0 44.6 111.1 51.6 41.1 
Percentage of the quantity effect (Q) 
explained by… 
  
    





















 -2.6 6.6 
Income -21.9 10.2 -10.0
**










Age profile 7.4 15.0
*
 5.5 6.1 4.3 6.0 








*** significant at the 1% level.  **significant at the 5% level.  ** significant at the 10% level.   




Figures for the Main Text 
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Figure 5:  Political Involvement in the US by Race and Ethnicity, 2009 
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Figure 7:  Comparison among Areas of Voter Turnout for 2008 Presidential Election 
 
 




























































Figure 9:  Voting in the US by Citizenship Status, 2008 Presidential Election 
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Figure 11:  Group Leadership in the US by Race and Ethnicity, 2009 
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Figure 17: Dining with Family in the US by Race and Ethnicity, 2009 
 
 


























































Native, born in US

































































































Native, born in US











A. The survey data 
All the non-voting variables are from the Civic Engagement Supplement to the Current Population 
Survey (November 2009).  The voting sample is from the Voting and Registration Supplement 
(November 2008).  Information on the sample sizes in shown in Table 26. 
The survey data are from a complex survey design including stratified sampling.42  The primary sampling 
units (PSU’s) in the CPS consist of about 2,000 geographic areas in the US.  The PSU’s are stratified 
within each state.  Some strata are singletons, and the sole PSU in such ends up in the sample with 
certainty.  One PSU is drawn from each of the remaining strata, with selection probability proportional 
to the PSU’s population.  In a second sampling stage, housing units within the PSU are chosen to be 
secondary sampling units (SSU’s).  The households surveyed live in the SSU’s. 
To incorporate the survey design effects for calculation of the estimation error, standard methods in 
survey statistics require identification of the strata, the PSU’s, and the selection probability of each 
respondent.  Survey weights are available in the CPS, which account for unequal selection probabilities, 
noninterview adjustments, and other adjustments intended to correct for nonproportional sampling 
along various demographic dimensions such as race, age, and gender.  Neither the strata nor the PSU’s 
are identified in the publicly available data.  Some analyses of CPS data use only the weights when 
accounting for survey design effects in the variance of estimates.  However, ignoring the design effects 
from stratified sampling causes the estimated standard errors to be too large.  Furthermore, ignoring 
the clustering of respondents within the PSU’s has the opposite effect (Heeringa, West, and Berglund, 
2010, p.35).   
Davern et al. (2007) addressed the problem of creating pseudo-strata for another CPS dataset.  They 
found that by making use of geographical identifiers available in the survey they could create 
approximate stratum identifiers that led to standard error estimates that were similar to estimates 
derived from the internal Census Bureau file.  We followed their method to pseudo-stratify to 
respondents.  The state of residence of the respondent is always identified in the public data.  
Additionally, the county or the CBSA (core-based statistical area) may also be available.  The process to 
create the pseudo-strata  is as follows. 
1. If the CBSA of the respondent is identified, then the state and the CBSA uniquely create a 
stratum. 
2. If the CBSA of the respondent is not identified but the county is, then the state and the county 
uniquely create a stratum. 
3. If neither the CBSA nor the county are available, then all respondents in the state are grouped 
into a stratum for observations “not elsewhere classified.” 
                                                          
42




In the absence of the PSU identifier, we cluster on the household, which accounts for correlation in the 
responses by individuals living in the same household but treats different households within the same 
PSU as independent.  Thus, other things equal, this level of clustering biases the standard errors 
downward.  However, Davern et al. (2007) suggest this procedure, and find that when such clustering is 
used along with the pseudo-stratification as described above, the estimated standard errors are close to 
those that would be calculated using the confidential PSU and strata identifiers available only to the 
Census Bureau.  The number of strata and PSU’s in each subsample are also shown in Table 26. 
B. Technical Details of the Decompositions 
Jann (2008) provides a good overview of the Oaxaca-Blinder methodology we use to decompose the 
engagement gaps between California and the rest of the US, as well as information on the Stata program 
we used to compute the estimates, oaxaca.  In particular, we use the two-fold decomposition from 
equation (6) in Jann (2008), with the estimates for US-3 playing the role of the reference coefficients.43 
It is well known in the literature that the detailed decomposition results for categorical regressors 
depend on which category is omitted (as the base category) from the regressions (Jann (2008) provides 
several citations).  Thus, instead of naïve coding of categorical variables as a set of dummy variables, we 
use deviation contrasts (see Jann (2008) for details), which remove the sensitivity of the results to a 
choice of base category. 
All standard errors for the decompositions (as well as for all other statistics in the paper) are computed 
with the Taylor Series linearization method (Heeringa, West, and Berglund, 2010), and are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustering within PSU’s. 
C. Additional Tables 
 
                                                          
43
 In particular, US-3 is group A and California takes the role of group B in equation (6) of Jann (2008). 
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Table 20:  Decomposition of California’s Gaps in Political Civic Engagement – Detailed Results 
   Y = Discuss Politics 
 
Y = Political Acts 
 
Y = Voted 












Ave. Y for US-3 ( ̅    ) 36.43*** (35.4,37.5)  17.92*** (17.1,18.7)  64.80*** (64.3,65.3) 
Ave. Y for CA ( ̅  ) 27.43*** (24.7,30.1)  14.33*** (12.3,16.3)  63.38*** (61.8,64.9) 
Total Gap (Δ) 9.01*** (6.1,11.9)  3.59*** (1.4,5.8)  1.41* (-0.2,3.0) 
Explained Gap (Q) 3.36*** (1.7,5.0)  4.43*** (3.3,5.6)  1.55*** (0.7,2.4) 
Unexplained Gap (U) 5.65*** (2.5,8.8)  -0.84 (-2.9,1.2)  -0.14 (-1.7,1.5) 
         
Detailed decomposition Qj × 100 Uj × 100  Qj × 100 Uj × 100  Qj × 100 Uj × 100 
Hispanic 0.665** 1.194  0.406** 0.764*  0.259** -0.351 
Non-Hispanic 0.665** -2.109  0.406** -1.366*  0.259** 1.122 
White 0.266** -0.092  0.099 -1.816  0.142*** -1.286 
Black 0.065 0.276  -0.305*** -0.461*  0.600*** 0.126 
Native American -0.006 -0.069  -0.005 0.013  0.008 0.031 
Asian 1.458*** 0.215  1.112*** -0.186  1.326*** -0.451 
Multiracial -0.019 0.014  -0.048 0.183*  -0.014 0.006 
Born in USA 0.066 -4.255**  1.217*** -0.919  0.649*** -1.188 
Born in PR/other -0.039 0.006  -0.015 0.013  -0.025* 0.012 
Native born abroad -0.108* 0.190  -0.064 -0.125  -0.003 0.036 
Naturalized citizen 0.707** -1.229*  0.668*** -0.586  0.596*** -1.375** 
Non-citizen 0.081 -0.966  0.414** -0.545  NA NA 
No HS degree 0.707*** -0.813  0.796*** -0.732**  -0.094 -0.681*** 
High school -0.529*** -0.606  -0.647*** -0.031  -0.770*** 0.551* 
Some college 0.037 -0.628  0.018 -0.028  -0.125*** 0.257 
2-year college 0.023 0.113  0.000 0.157  -0.068*** 0.166 
4-year college -0.129 1.166**  -0.145 0.477  -0.341*** 0.230 
Advanced degree 0.200*** 0.217  0.301*** 0.010  -0.170*** 0.043 
Income: missing -0.034 -0.539  -0.066 -0.115  -0.333*** 0.633* 
Income: < $35K -0.131* 0.840  -0.060 -0.101  -0.107*** -0.744** 
Income: $35-50K -0.005 0.366  0.031 0.474*  0.022 -0.057 
Income: $50-75K 0.004 0.570  -0.015 0.053  0.081* 0.264 
Income: > $75K -0.365*** -1.496  -0.161** -1.025  -0.803*** -0.345 
In a metro area -0.226* 8.692  0.095 3.875  -0.042 -1.874 
Not in metro area -0.226* -0.133  0.095 -0.061  -0.042 0.048 
Age: 18-25 0.023 0.516  0.082 0.252  0.167** -0.278 
Age: 26-35 0.119** -0.864  0.113** -0.318  0.082 -0.265 
Age: 36-45 -0.002 -0.508  -0.002 -0.070  0.001 -0.275 
Age: 46-55 0.006 0.943*  0.006 -0.335  -0.009 0.039 
Age: 56-65 0.073 -0.028  0.063 -0.173  0.017 0.174 
Age: 66-75 0.017 -0.231  0.087** 0.149  0.072 0.303* 
Age: >75 -0.008 0.115  -0.035 0.073  0.039 -0.008 
Female -0.025 -0.493  -0.006 -0.463  0.008 -0.286 
Male -0.025 0.485  -0.006 0.449  0.008 0.268 
Married 0.026 0.710  0.001 0.203  0.081*** 0.672 
Not married 0.026 -0.622  0.001 -0.179  0.081*** -0.586 
Constant   4.702     1.649     4.929 
*** significant at the 1% level.  **significant at the 5% level.  ** significant at the 10% level.   
Table notes: Each pair of columns presents the results from separate regression decompositions of the gap between CA and US-




Table 21:  Decomposition of California’s Gaps in Social Civic Engagement – Detailed Results 
   Y = Group Leadership 
 
Y = Group Participation 
 
Y = Help Neighbor 












Ave. Y for US-3 ( ̅    ) 10.61*** (10.0,11.2)  36.88*** (35.8,37.9)  58.17*** (57.0,59.3) 
Ave. Y for CA ( ̅  ) 7.64*** (6.3,9.0)  33.57*** (30.7,36.4)  48.82*** (45.7,52.0) 
Total Gap (Δ) 2.97*** (1.5,4.5)  3.31** (0.2,6.4)  9.35*** (6.0,12.7) 
Explained Gap (Q) 3.22*** (2.4,4.1)  4.56*** (2.8,6.4)  4.80*** (3.0,6.6) 
Unexplained Gap (U) -0.25 (-1.7,1.2)  -1.25 (-4.5,2.0)  4.55** (0.8,8.3) 
         
Detailed decomposition Qj × 100 Uj × 100  Qj × 100 Uj × 100  Qj × 100 Uj × 100 
Hispanic 0.183 0.144  0.602* 1.045  0.648* 0.835 
Non-Hispanic 0.183 -0.256  0.602* -1.866  0.648* -1.495 
White 0.102** 1.591  0.029 1.566  0.232** -5.753* 
Black 0.057 0.050  0.277** 0.096  -0.349** -0.232 
Native American 0.001 -0.126  0.006 -0.188  0.002 -0.045 
Asian 0.557*** -0.076  0.675** 0.866  0.559 0.561 
Multiracial -0.013 0.179**  -0.022 0.160  -0.033 0.213 
Born in USA 0.577** -2.316**  0.896* -8.019***  1.048* -4.585** 
Born in PR/other 0.000 0.008  -0.021 0.028  0.068* 0.038 
Native born abroad -0.026 -0.031  -0.061 0.028  0.087* -0.182 
Naturalized citizen 0.584*** -0.601*  0.385 -2.442***  0.294 -1.347 
Non-citizen 0.077 -0.044  0.429 -1.531**    
No HS degree 0.527*** -0.657***  1.232*** -1.906***  0.149 0.671 
High school -0.481*** -0.325  -0.856*** 0.137  -0.148* -0.230 
Some college 0.031 -0.162  0.000 -0.045  -0.019 0.414 
2-year college -0.003 -0.036  0.000 -0.007  -0.015 -0.401 
4-year college -0.071 0.116  -0.206 0.463  -0.051 0.614 
Advanced degree 0.276*** 0.417*  0.431*** 0.603*  0.060* -0.224 
Income: missing -0.021 0.313*  -0.089 -0.012  -0.068 -0.278 
Income: < $35K -0.078* -0.675**  -0.122* -1.360*  -0.125* -2.294*** 
Income: $35-50K -0.012 0.049  0.008 0.645  0.079 1.314*** 
Income: $50-75K -0.001 -0.087  -0.019 -0.434  -0.004 -0.292 
Income: > $75K -0.239*** -0.029  -0.385*** 0.487  -0.209** 0.149 
In a metro area 0.301*** 7.537*  0.110 12.764**  0.363*** 5.796 
Not in metro area 0.301*** -0.120*  0.110 -0.203**  0.363*** -0.095 
Age: 18-25 0.058 0.142  0.063 -0.619  0.186 -0.518 
Age: 26-35 0.160*** -0.218  0.164** 0.461  0.134** -0.658 
Age: 36-45 -0.004 -0.342  0.005 -0.002  0.007 0.140 
Age: 46-55 0.002 0.068  -0.003 -0.855  0.013 -0.076 
Age: 56-65 0.030 0.220  -0.013 -0.048  0.045 0.222 
Age: 66-75 0.091* 0.133  0.117** -0.153  0.119** 0.193 
Age: >75 0.019 -0.091  0.037 0.464**  -0.035 0.106 
Female 0.007 0.188  0.017 1.090**  0.002 1.100** 
Male 0.007 -0.184  0.017 -1.061**  0.002 -1.083** 
Married 0.019 0.252  0.075 0.431  0.094 0.745 
Not married 0.019 -0.223  0.075 -0.382  0.094 -0.662 
Constant   -5.061     -1.453     15.142** 
*** significant at the 1% level.  **significant at the 5% level.  ** significant at the 10% level.   
Table notes:  see notes to previous table. 
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Table 22:  Decomposition of New York’s Gaps in Political Civic Engagement – Detailed Results 
   Y = Discuss Politics 
 
Y = Political Acts 
 
Y = Voted 












Ave. Y for US-3 ( ̅    ) 36.43*** (35.4,37.5)  17.92*** (17.1,18.7)  64.80*** (64.3,65.3) 
Ave. Y for NY ( ̅  ) 33.42*** (29.5,37.4)  15.97*** (13.1,18.8)  58.83*** (56.8,60.9) 
Total Gap (Δ) 3.01 (-1.1,7.1)  1.95 (-1.0,4.9)  5.96*** (3.8,8.1) 
Explained Gap (Q) 0.78 (-0.6,2.2)  1.99*** (0.7,3.3)  2.16*** (1.2,3.1) 
Unexplained Gap (U) 2.23 (-1.6,6.1)  -0.05 (-2.8,2.7)  3.80*** (1.8,5.8) 
         
Detailed decomposition Qj × 100 Uj × 100  Qj × 100 Uj × 100  Qj × 100 Uj × 100 
Hispanic 0.177* 0.895*  0.104* -0.397  0.071** -0.512** 
Non-Hispanic 0.177* -4.802*  0.104* 2.189  0.071** 4.367*** 
White 0.234* 4.172  0.084 1.591  0.129*** -7.515*** 
Black -0.034 1.701  0.138 -0.171  -0.338*** -0.488 
Native American 0.018 -0.073  0.016 0.010  -0.024** 0.064* 
Asian 0.238 -0.159  0.179 -0.326  0.449*** -0.652** 
Multiracial -0.005 0.156  -0.022 0.025  0.007 -0.041 
Born in USA 0.042 0.716  0.766*** 5.744  0.520*** -2.899 
Born in PR/other 0.150 -0.090  0.057 0.339  0.099* -0.272* 
Native born abroad 0.035 -0.061  0.020 -0.151  -0.002 0.140** 
Naturalized citizen 0.520** 1.156  0.481*** 1.215  0.391*** 0.787* 
Non-citizen 0.031 1.085  0.167** 1.432**    
No HS degree 0.030 0.399  0.032 -0.459  0.129 -0.534** 
High school -0.037 -0.450  -0.043 -0.723  -0.251*** -0.487 
Some college -0.063 0.289  -0.030 0.255  0.111*** 0.157 
2-year college -0.023 1.071**  0.000 -0.054  -0.045 -0.015 
4-year college -0.161 0.062  -0.209 0.735  -0.185** 0.572* 
Advanced degree -0.128 -1.695***  -0.156 0.186  -0.360*** 0.307 
Income: missing 0.076 0.884  0.165** 0.438  1.371*** 1.152** 
Income: < $35K -0.094 0.702  -0.044 1.143*  -0.115*** -0.564 
Income: $35-50K -0.007 0.516  0.038 -0.147  0.045** 0.006 
Income: $50-75K -0.014 -1.897***  0.065 -0.128  0.165*** 0.068 
Income: > $75K -0.345** 0.781  -0.146* -1.245  -0.063 -0.445 
In a metro area -0.151* -0.032  0.062 3.483  -0.025 -2.325 
Not in metro area -0.151* 0.003  0.062 -0.308  -0.025 0.256 
Age: 18-25 -0.006 -0.163  -0.010 0.633  0.107 0.770** 
Age: 26-35 0.031 0.646  0.022 -0.157  -0.017 -0.007 
Age: 36-45 0.013 -0.714  0.008 -0.565  -0.056 0.433 
Age: 46-55 0.019 -1.101  0.005 0.291  -0.017 -1.117*** 
Age: 56-65 -0.015 0.333  0.007 0.490  -0.016 0.061 
Age: 66-75 0.009 0.393  0.046 0.201  -0.102 0.121 
Age: >75 0.002 0.028  0.006 -0.596*  -0.119** -0.267 
Female 0.014 -1.248*  0.005 -0.153  -0.019 0.218 
Male 0.014 1.129*  0.005 0.139  -0.019 -0.194 
Married 0.093* -1.036  0.005 0.421  0.145*** 0.943* 
Not married 0.093* 1.055  0.005 -0.435  0.145*** -0.881* 
Constant   -2.418     -14.992**     12.597*** 
*** significant at the 1% level.  **significant at the 5% level.  ** significant at the 10% level.   
Table notes:  see notes to Table 20. 
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Table 23:  Decomposition of Texas’ Gaps in Political Civic Engagement – Detailed Results 
   Y = Discuss Politics 
 
Y = Political Acts 
 
Y = Voted 












Ave. Y for US-3 ( ̅    ) 36.43*** (35.4,37.5)  17.92*** (17.1,18.7)  64.80*** (64.3,65.3) 
Ave. Y for TX ( ̅  ) 33.40*** (29.3,37.5)  16.07*** (13.2,18.9)  56.09*** (54.2,57.9) 
Total Gap (Δ) 3.03 (-1.2,7.2)  1.85 (-1.1,4.8)  8.71*** (6.8,10.6) 
Explained Gap (Q) 2.28*** (0.8,3.8)  2.69*** (1.5,3.9)  1.71*** (0.7,2.7) 
Unexplained Gap (U) 0.75 (-3.6,5.1)  -0.84 (-3.6,2.0)  7.00*** (5.2,8.8) 
         
Detailed decomposition Qj × 100 Uj × 100  Qj × 100 Uj × 100  Qj × 100 Uj × 100 
Hispanic 0.595** 0.739  0.367** 0.504  0.345** 1.319*** 
Non-Hispanic 0.595** -1.484  0.367** -1.014  0.345** -3.098*** 
White -0.148 20.098***  -0.057 6.473  -0.007 -2.467 
Black 0.016 1.982**  -0.076 1.043  0.027 -0.568 
Native American -0.002 -0.493  -0.002 -0.168  -0.014 0.036 
Asian -0.072 0.227  -0.057 0.018  0.024 0.127 
Multiracial 0.034 0.024  0.086** 0.005  -0.002 -0.070 
Born in USA 0.018 -6.965**  0.326*** -1.948  0.102*** 1.095 
Born in PR/other -0.044 NA  -0.017 NA  -0.022* 0.015 
Native born abroad -0.047 0.276*  -0.022 0.161**  -0.005 -0.101 
Naturalized citizen 0.043 0.076  0.038 -0.018  0.075** -0.230 
Non-citizen 0.042 -0.452  0.218** -0.397  NA NA 
No HS degree 0.682*** -0.637  0.817*** -0.150  0.915*** -0.577* 
High school -0.140 0.790  -0.183 0.675  -0.173** 0.395 
Some college 0.018 -0.365  0.009 0.681  -0.094*** 0.244 
2-year college 0.059 0.395  -0.001 0.378  0.074*** -0.183 
4-year college 0.048 0.474  0.063 0.308  0.070 0.118 
Advanced degree 0.256*** -0.365  0.396*** -0.797**  0.306*** 0.219 
Income: missing -0.026 -0.437  -0.069 -0.403  -1.012*** -0.307 
Income: < $35K 0.108 -1.278  0.057 1.027  0.133*** 0.077 
Income: $35-50K 0.002 0.559  -0.013 -0.108  -0.015 0.322 
Income: $50-75K 0.006 0.327  -0.026 0.485  0.021 0.207 
Income: > $75K 0.263* 0.382  0.111 -0.293  -0.016 -0.510 
In a metro area -0.149* 0.698  0.063 0.271  -0.019 1.151 
Not in metro area -0.149* -0.060  0.063 -0.023  -0.019 -0.158 
Age: 18-25 -0.025 0.224  -0.067 0.077  0.248*** 0.591* 
Age: 26-35 0.222** -0.742  0.214*** -0.918  0.213*** 0.958*** 
Age: 36-45 0.015 -0.819  0.008 -0.161  -0.011 -0.498 
Age: 46-55 0.051 0.595  0.057 -0.717  -0.010 -0.166 
Age: 56-65 0.072 0.216  0.073 0.082  0.109*** -0.238 
Age: 66-75 -0.002 -0.548  -0.013 0.304  -0.009 -0.424** 
Age: >75 -0.010 0.345  -0.040 0.240  0.081* 0.084 
Female 0.002 0.049  0.000 0.149  0.000 -0.148 
Male 0.002 -0.045  0.000 -0.140  0.000 0.136 
Married -0.026 -0.177  -0.001 -0.748  0.027 0.087 
Not married -0.026 0.137  -0.001 0.583  0.027 -0.072 
Constant   -12.994     -6.298     9.630** 
*** significant at the 1% level.  **significant at the 5% level.  ** significant at the 10% level.   
Table notes:  see notes to Table 20. 
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Table 24:  Decomposition of New York’s Gaps in Social Civic Engagement – Detailed Results 
   Y = Group Leadership 
 
Y = Group Participation 
 
Y = Help Neighbor 












Ave. Y for US-3 ( ̅    ) 10.61*** (10.0,11.2)  36.88*** (35.8,37.9)  58.17*** (57.0,59.3) 
Ave. Y for NY ( ̅  ) 6.01*** (4.3,7.7)  33.67*** (29.7,37.6)  52.82*** (48.4,57.2) 
Total Gap (Δ) 4.60*** (2.8,6.4)  3.20 (-0.9,7.3)  5.35** (0.8,9.9) 
Explained Gap (Q) 1.10** (0.2,2.0)  1.43* (-0.2,3.1)  2.76*** (1.3,4.2) 
Unexplained Gap (U) 3.50*** (1.7,5.3)  1.77 (-2.1,5.7)  2.59 (-1.9,7.1) 
         
Detailed decomposition Qj × 100 Uj × 100  Qj × 100 Uj × 100  Qj × 100 Uj × 100 
Hispanic 0.048 -0.058  0.155* -0.383  0.170 0.066 
Non-Hispanic 0.048 0.319  0.155* 2.110  0.170 -0.363 
White 0.089 1.607  0.025 -7.942***  0.194 1.803 
Black -0.027 -0.258  -0.126 -0.526  0.182 1.740 
Native American -0.003 -0.006  -0.019 0.004  -0.005 -0.081 
Asian 0.091 -0.184*  0.109 -0.092  0.093 -0.459 
Multiracial -0.007 0.075  -0.012 0.216  -0.007 0.309 
Born in USA 0.366** 6.957*  0.569* 1.527  0.669* -0.734 
Born in PR/other -0.002 0.374**  0.077 0.173  -0.255 1.163*** 
Native born abroad 0.009 -0.175  0.020 -0.093  -0.025 -0.195* 
Naturalized citizen 0.427*** 1.630**  0.281 0.416  0.217 1.607* 
Non-citizen 0.031 1.467**  0.173 1.556**    
No HS degree 0.014 -0.460**  0.031 -0.680  0.009 0.755 
High school -0.030 -0.720*  -0.048 -0.168  -0.018 0.516 
Some college -0.051* -0.129  0.000 0.026  0.031 -0.049 
2-year college 0.002 0.241  0.000 -0.464  0.010 0.004 
4-year college -0.110 -0.085  -0.317* 0.468  -0.066 -0.191 
Advanced degree -0.146 0.563  -0.223 0.968*  -0.037 -0.779 
Income: missing 0.051 -0.109  0.208** -0.926  0.181* 0.354 
Income: < $35K -0.058 -0.778*  -0.090 -0.053  -0.084 -0.002 
Income: $35-50K -0.014 -0.327  0.010 0.716  0.093 -0.896 
Income: $50-75K 0.005 0.109  0.083 -0.297  0.015 -0.669 
Income: > $75K -0.226** 1.754***  -0.354** 0.216  -0.198* 3.695*** 
In a metro area 0.199*** -0.297  0.072 -0.710  0.245*** -2.288 
Not in metro area 0.199*** 0.025  0.072 0.061  0.245*** 0.190 
Age: 18-25 -0.005 0.148  -0.007 0.951  -0.005 -0.346 
Age: 26-35 0.035 -0.722*  0.038 0.268  0.031 0.432 
Age: 36-45 0.004 -0.224  -0.002 -0.550  -0.005 0.682 
Age: 46-55 0.003 0.322  -0.003 -0.561  0.017 -0.770 
Age: 56-65 0.004 0.464  -0.001 0.117  -0.001 0.110 
Age: 66-75 0.045 -0.129  0.061 -0.642  0.073 -0.073 
Age: >75 -0.004 0.073  -0.007 0.334  0.008 0.040 
Female -0.006 -0.096  -0.014 -0.408  -0.001 -0.765 
Male -0.006 0.087  -0.014 0.369  -0.001 0.691 
Married 0.065** -0.130  0.263** 1.261  0.299** 0.747 
Not married 0.065** 0.135  0.263** -1.304  0.299** -0.771 
Constant   -7.967     5.811     -3.234 
*** significant at the 1% level.  **significant at the 5% level.  ** significant at the 10% level.   
Table notes:  see notes to Table 20. 
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Table 25:  Decomposition of Texas’ Gaps in Social Civic Engagement – Detailed Results 
   Y = Group Leadership 
 
Y = Group Participation 
 
Y = Help Neighbor 












Ave. Y for US-3 ( ̅    ) 10.61*** (10.0,11.2)  36.88*** (35.8,37.9)  58.17*** (57.0,59.3) 
Ave. Y for TX ( ̅  ) 9.77*** (7.5,12.1)  33.53*** (29.6,37.5)  52.25*** (47.8,56.7) 
Total Gap (Δ) 0.84 (-1.5,3.2)  3.35 (-0.7,7.4)  5.92** (1.3,10.5) 
Explained Gap (Q) 2.19*** (1.3,3.1)  3.72*** (1.9,5.6)  2.44*** (0.8,4.1) 
Unexplained Gap (U) -1.36 (-3.7,1.0)  -0.37 (-4.4,3.7)  3.49 (-1.2,8.1) 
         
Detailed decomposition Qj × 100 Uj × 100  Qj × 100 Uj × 100  Qj × 100 Uj × 100 
Hispanic 0.165 0.217  0.545* 0.054  0.585* 0.923 
Non-Hispanic 0.165 -0.436  0.545* -0.108  0.585* -1.864 
White -0.058 4.923**  -0.017 12.197**  -0.122 -16.422*** 
Black 0.014 0.834**  0.072 2.071**  -0.087 -0.534 
Native American 0.000 -0.315  0.001 -0.652  0.001 0.066 
Asian -0.028 0.230*  -0.035 0.399  -0.030 -0.825** 
Multiracial 0.024 0.062  0.041 0.114  0.064 0.197 
Born in USA 0.157** 0.182  0.242* -0.954  0.277* -3.640 
Born in PR/other 0.001 NA  -0.023 NA  0.078* NA 
Native born abroad -0.010 0.013  -0.023 0.071  0.033 0.149 
Naturalized citizen 0.034 0.088  0.023 0.245  0.018 -0.056 
Non-citizen 0.041 -0.145  0.226 -0.255    
No HS degree 0.534*** -0.027  1.255*** -0.069  0.151 1.612* 
High school -0.139 0.676  -0.244 1.977**  -0.041 -0.245 
Some college 0.016 0.487  0.000 0.626  -0.010 -1.319* 
2-year college -0.008 -0.266  0.000 -0.074  -0.035 0.587 
4-year college 0.028 -0.349  0.082 -0.471  0.016 -0.707 
Advanced degree 0.351*** 0.076  0.558*** -0.388  0.080 -0.391 
Income: missing -0.019 -0.291  -0.082 -0.686  -0.065 0.190 
Income: < $35K 0.072 -0.793  0.114 -0.835  0.097 -3.046** 
Income: $35-50K 0.005 0.413  -0.004 0.482  -0.031 1.332* 
Income: $50-75K -0.002 -0.314  -0.033 0.100  -0.006 -1.000 
Income: > $75K 0.169* 0.714  0.269* 0.880  0.141 0.630 
In a metro area 0.198*** -1.642  0.072 -5.073**  0.240*** 3.985 
Not in metro area 0.198*** 0.141  0.072 0.435**  0.240*** -0.343 
Age: 18-25 -0.046 -0.136  -0.049 0.843  -0.174 -0.615 
Age: 26-35 0.299*** -0.665  0.312*** -0.716  0.243** 0.013 
Age: 36-45 0.009 -0.455  -0.008 -0.241  -0.012 -0.840 
Age: 46-55 0.025 -0.201  -0.042 -0.319  0.099 -0.413 
Age: 56-65 0.032 0.291  -0.014 0.739  0.050 -0.073 
Age: 66-75 -0.013 0.318  -0.013 -0.424  -0.018 0.600 
Age: >75 0.023 0.101  0.043 -0.067  -0.040 0.305 
Female -0.001 -0.356  0.000 -1.323*  0.000 -0.396 
Male -0.001 0.332  0.000 1.238*  0.000 0.371 
Married -0.020 0.046  -0.082 1.294  -0.088 0.977 
Not married -0.020 -0.036  -0.082 -1.004  -0.088 -0.758 
Constant   -5.072     -10.479     26.417*** 
*** significant at the 1% level.  **significant at the 5% level.  ** significant at the 10% level.   
Table notes:  see notes to Table 20. 
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Table 26:  Size and Design of the Survey Samples 
   
Observations Strata PSU’s 
US sample 
   
 
Voting Supplement (2008) 92,360 348 51,023 
 




Discuss Politics 20,431 347 11,588 
  
Political Acts 21,226 347 13,694 
  
Group Leadership 21,226 347 12,020 
  
Group Participation 21,226 347 12,020 
  





Voting Supplement (2008) 6,738 24 3,624 
 




Discuss Politics 1,796 24 892 
  
Political Acts 1,868 24 1,063 
  
Group Leadership 1,868 24 931 
  
Group Participation 1,868 24 931 
  
Help Neighbor 1,791 24 894 
Table notes:  The number of observations and primary sampling units (PSU’s) differs for variables from 
the same survey due to missing responses.  PSU’s are households. 
 
 
